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Abstract: 
 
A majority of voters in several states have voted in favor of eliminating certain poultry and 
livestock products from being available in the market place. At the same time, the majority of 
consumers in these states regularly purchase products that employ such production practices. This 
research examines why individuals sometimes choose to vote in favor of ballot initiatives which 
result in banning products they regularly purchase, a phenomenon called the vote-buy gap. In 
order to detect and determine the vote-buy gap, a real-food, real-money experiment was 
conducted. Respondents first made a shopping choice between snack options, some of which 
included eggs from caged hens as an ingredient.  After the snack selection was made, participants 
then voted on a proposition to ban snack options that included shelled eggs from caged hens. 
Results support the Vote-Buy Gap Hypothesis and indicate that the vote-buy gap was present in 
the experiment: in the control treatment approximately 80% of the individuals who chose snacks 
with caged eggs in their shopping decision also voted in favor of banning snacks with cage eggs. 
This experiment is the first to replicate the vote-buy gap in an experimental lab setting. A number 
of alternative treatments were employed to test several other hypotheses related to the underlying 
causes of the vote-buy gap, but the data failed to provide strong support for any of the 
hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
California implemented the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, also known as Proposition 2 
along with an additional state law on January 1, 2015, prohibiting the production and sale of 
shelled eggs from hens housed in battery cages. Although 63.5% of votes were in support of ban, 
90% of eggs purchased in California did not comply with the standards prior to the ban (Chang, 
Lusk and Norwood 2010; Bovay and Sumner 2013; Smithson et al., 2014). Why did Californians 
vote in a manner that did not reflect their purchasing behavior? 
After passage of Proposition 2, numerous producers have had to adopt more costly 
production practices. Specifically, Proposition 2 has forced many producers to convert from cage 
egg production (eggs produced from hens housed in battery cages) to more costly production 
practices utilizing larger or no cages at all. Sumner et al. (2008) estimated implementation of 
alternative production systems have at least 20% higher production costs; subsequently, 
increasing retail egg prices at least 25% (Sumner et al. 2008). If individuals were willing to pay 
the increased retail price of eggs, accrued as a result of producers using more costly production 
practices, this would not be as great a concern to egg producers. However, although the majority 
2 
 
of California voters supported Proposition 2, most consumers have expressed that they are not 
willing to pay for the now higher priced eggs. Therefore, resulting in a loss of consumers in the 
egg market and creating a costly, unfunded mandate to producers (Allendar and Richards 2010). 
Passing legislation of this nature could be financially costly for many consumers, who 
prior to the passing of Proposition 2 could afford to purchase eggs. As a result of the increase in 
egg prices, some consumers may no longer be willing or able to purchase such products. 
Identifying distinct influences that cause individuals to vote in a different manner than their 
purchases is important for both consumers and producers of controversial agricultural production 
practices. Voting in favor of legislation regarding controversial agricultural production practices, 
which is inconsistent with consumer purchasing behavior, has resulted in higher costs to 
producers and an increase in retail prices for the consumers (Allendar and Richards 2010; Malone 
and Lusk 2016; Mullaly and Lusk 2016). Therefore, the primary purpose of this research is to 
determine why the majority of individuals vote in favor of banning controversial agricultural 
production practices, when the majority of consumers regularly purchase products in the 
marketplace procured from these controversial agricultural production practices.  
In order to accomplish the primary objective, an experiment was conducted using foods 
made with cage and cage free eggs to test several hypotheses about the drivers of the gap between 
voting and buying behavior.  Six specific objectives of the study are to: (1) determine if a vote-
buy gap can be replicated in an experimental lab setting, (2) determine how voting decisions to 
ban cage produced eggs fluctuate with varying group sizes, (3) determine market-based 
preferences for products made with cage and cage-free produced eggs, (4) determine how voting 
and purchasing decisions differ with knowledge of other individuals’ decisions, (5) determine 
how “non-buyers” vote on a ballot initiative to ban cage produced eggs, and (6) identify 
individual characteristics (e.g. socioeconomic status, demographics, political affiliation) which 
correlate with the gap between vote and purchase decisions.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Influence of Advocacy Groups 
In recent years, advocacy groups’ influential capabilities have successfully brought about ballot 
initiatives promoting animal welfare onto various states’ ballot sheets. Various advocacy groups 
and organizations, such as the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), are key players in 
gaining public attention on issues concerning animal welfare. 
  These various advocacy groups and organizations gain public attention on animal welfare 
issues by taking advantage of public sentiment towards the treatment of animals in agricultural 
production practices. The efforts have led to public support for ballot initiatives to improve 
animal welfare. Support for such ballot initiatives is accomplished through various media outlets 
such as the use of negative campaign advertisements, as seen on television and various websites, 
which depict the mistreatment of animals in today’s current agricultural production practices.  
Several states, such as Florida, Arizona, and California, have held ballot initiatives banning 
certain housing practices thought to be detrimental to farm animal welfare. These three states 
have all enacted laws which ban battery cages and/or gestations crates in the egg and pork 
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production industries (Tonsor, Wolf and Olynk 2009; Smithson et al. 2014). Similar initiatives 
concerning animal welfare, such as the use of battery cages for housing hens, and the 
confinement of hogs and veal using gestation crates, have been introduced in various states such 
as Colorado, Ohio, Oregon, and Michigan.  As a result, animal welfare initiatives have caused 
many producers to alter their production practices (Tonsor, Wolf and Olynk 2009; The Wall 
Street Journal 2013; Malone and Lusk 2016). Although residents of these states voted in support 
of various animal welfare initiatives, implementation of initiatives led to the removal of items 
many consumers regularly purchase in the marketplace (Bovay and Sumner 2013).  
Among the previously listed states, where initiatives concerning animal welfare were 
enacted, California’s Proposition 2 received substantial public attention. According to Norwood 
and Lusk (2011), Proposition 2 was influential for four main reasons. First, Proposition 2 
gathered substantially more public attention than the typical agricultural issue. Second, California 
has the largest agricultural output – in terms of dollar value – than any other state and is the fifth 
largest producer of eggs in the United States. Third, California is a “trend-setting” state. Once 
certain regulations are implemented in California, those regulations have the tendency to be 
adopted by other states as well. Finally, the percentage of support of Proposition 2 was much 
larger than that of opposition. Approximately two-thirds of the voters in California voted in 
support of the ballot initiative (Norwood and Lusk 2011). 
Although the majority of consumers in the United States continue to regularly purchase 
eggs from cage production practices, an increase has been observed in the demand for specialty 
eggs from alternative production practices.  These alternative production practices comply with 
rules and regulations of the various animal welfare ballot initiatives. Consumer demand for 
specialty eggs produced using alternative practices have increased by reason of animal welfare 
concerns, food safety issues, and environmental concerns - even if the particular state doesn’t 
enforce such laws (Von Borell and Sorensen 2004).  
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Specifically, observing alternative egg production, these diversified specialty eggs span 
from Omega-3 enriched, cage-free, organic, and free-range eggs. Chang, Lusk, and Norwood 
(2010) conducted an analysis using retail scanner data from two regional markets in the United 
States in order to determine which egg attributes are most desirable to consumers. The two 
regional markets observed were that of San Francisco/Oakland, California and Dallas/Fort Worth, 
Texas areas. Based on their estimates 42% and 36% of the cage-free premium and organic 
premium price respectively, can be attributed to the color of the egg being brown rather than the 
type of production practice used. Eggs that were higher in Omega-3 and advertised to have health 
benefits were shown to have a 63.7% price premium. When combined with organic production 
practice, shown to have approximately an 85% premium over conventional eggs, the price 
premium was shown to be about 103% price premium (Chang, Lusk and Norwood 2010).  
Despite the fact that the market for specialty eggs is increasing, and the estimated price 
premiums were less costly in areas that recently banned battery cage egg production, specialty 
eggs make up a very small proportion of the market share. Only 10% and 5% of consumers in 
California and the United States respectively, display a willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the higher 
price premiums of alternative, or specialty eggs (Allender and Richards 2010; Chang, Lusk and 
Norwood 2010). 
Bans Implemented in States 
In November of 2008, California passed Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, more 
commonly recognized as Proposition 2. The ballot initiative passed with approximately 63.5% of 
Californians voting in support of Proposition 2. As a result, by January 1, 2015, producers in the 
poultry, veal, and hog industries had to adjust their previous production practices to adhere to the 
standards of the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act. Thus, allowing producers roughly seven 
years to convert to different production practice systems that abide by the new rules and 
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regulations. The standards for the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act California producers 
must now adhere to is stated as follows:  
Standards for Confining Farm Animals Initiative Statue – Requires that calves raised for 
veal, egg-laying hens and pregnant pigs be confined only in ways that allow these 
animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around freely. Exceptions 
made for transportation, rodeos, fairs, 4-H programs, lawful slaughter, research and 
veterinary purposes. Provides misdemeanor penalties, including a fine not to exceed 
$1,000 and/or imprisonment in jail for up to 180 days (Secretary of State, California, 
2008).  
As a result of passing Proposition 2, hens that were once kept confined in battery cages 
are now housed in larger cages – which adhere to such standards, and in some instances 
producers have converted to cage-free barns (Association of California Egg Farmers 2011). 
Despite the fact that the new regulations and standards implemented have increased housing 
space, and importantly to the voters an overall increase in hens’ animal welfare, the new 
standards for the egg production systems have been shown to be more costly to producers. Due to 
rising cost in egg production, consumers will subsequently observe a rise in egg prices. Concerns 
of consumers not willing to pay for the rise in egg prices is a major concern in the egg industry. 
By means of this concern, prior the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act mandates, 
Allendar and Richards (2010) conducted an ex-ante study examining consumers’ WTP for cage-
free eggs and compare the implied premium production cost increase when observing possible 
change in consumer surplus. Using household purchase data over a span of 2 years, a logistic 
model was created in order to predict consumers’ WTP for the increase in egg prices. As a result, 
the estimated average WTP was $0.524 per dozen above the conventional egg price. From this 
study it was estimated by a large majority of about 79.37% of households would not be willing to 
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pay higher priced premiums for eggs and consequentially observe an implied welfare loss of $106 
million, assuming a 20% increase in the retail price of eggs (Allendar and Richards 2010).  
The compensating variation of $106 million from the Allendar and Richards (2010) study 
was similar to the findings of Mullaly and Lusk’s (2016) ex-post analysis, which concluded 
consumer’s equivalent variation by the households in California to be $105 million. Mullaly and 
Lusk (2016) examined Nielsen retail scanner data, which contains 90% of market data, from three 
California and three non-California cities. The three California cities used were Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, and San Diego; the three non-California cities used were Chicago, Phoenix, and Salt 
Lake City/Boise. Using these various cities, regression models comparing the cost increase of 
eggs due to animal welfare laws (using California cities) vs. the costs of non-animal welfare cities 
(using non-California cities) were created. Results from this analysis indicated California cities 
were shown to have a 22% cost increase per dozen eggs, as a result of animal welfare laws 
implemented. Subsequently, over a sixteen week period, resulting in a 7.9% loss of consumption 
of eggs and a 12% increase to the value of sales (Mullaly and Lusk 2016).  
Similarly, another ex-post analysis conducted by Malone and Lusk (2016) comparing 
California to several states without animal welfare laws, indicated for every 1% increase in price, 
a decrease of sales by approximately 2.7 to 8% shown. Thus, implementation of Proposition 2 
creates a decrease of quantity demanded ranging from 2.71 to18.78%. Overall, subject to the 
method and model specification used, Malone and Lusk (2015) have estimated a cost increase to 
California consumers ranging anywhere from $0.48 to $1.08 per dozen eggs (Malone and Lusk 
2016; Mullaly and Lusk 2016). 
 The increase in cost, due to animal welfare laws, have been projected to have a major 
impact on individuals with low income and/or households containing 5 or more members 
(Allendar and Richards 2010). Allendar and Richards (2010) observed as income level decreases 
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and/or number of individuals per household increases, consumers’ WTP decreases as well. Using 
an ANOVA model to test the sample means, individuals with less than $30,000 in annual income 
were not willing to pay more than about $1.02 for a dozen eggs. Thus, due to household size 
and/or income less than $30,000 the results indicate that approximately 79% of California 
households would choose not to purchase cage-free eggs (Allendar and Richards 2010). 
Due to the increase in egg prices, it was suggested that consumers in lower 
socioeconomic classes would have to spend a greater percentage of their income to purchase eggs 
produced in California. As a result, it was presumed many producers would lose business to the 
out-of-state egg producers importing less costly shelled eggs from caged hens into California.  
With concerns of less costly shelled eggs imported from out of state, where cage 
production practices are still allowed, California egg producers joined with several animal 
welfare advocate groups to implement the accessory bill AB-1437. Essentially, AB-1437 prevents 
cheaper imported shelled eggs from other states from taking over the market (Malone and Lusk 
2016); requiring all shelled eggs imported into California must abide by the standards of 
California laws in respects to the poultry and hog industry (Assembly Committee on Agriculture 
2014). Jared Huffman, California Assemblyman at the time, constructed bill AB-1437 and in July 
of 2010, previous California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed bill AB-1437 into law 
(Los Angeles Times 2010; Official California Legislative Information 2010). The law has been 
challenged by other states as inconsistent with the interstate commerce clause, but attempts to 
nullify the law have been unsuccessful.    
Although bill AB-1437 was enacted into law, eliminating the possibility of out-of-state 
egg producers having the market advantage over California egg producers, there are chances 
some California egg producers will relocate to other states or even seize production (Official 
California Legislative Information 2010). Realization of this possibility, Republican state Senator 
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Tim Corder of Idaho, has pressed to introduce legislation in order to make Idaho a sought after, 
egg production friendly, location for California egg producers wishing to relocate. Idaho is not 
the only state looking to attract California egg producers. Other states’ poultry industries, such as 
Georgia and Nevada, have also attempted to attract California egg producers in hopes of 
increasing economic development in their poultry industries. In the instance California egg 
producers decide to move their business out-of-state or even close, the once fifth ranking state in 
egg production will experience a drastic decrease in production, tax revenue, and a large loss of 
jobs for California residents involved in egg production (Tonsor, Wolf, and Olynk. 2009; Wall 
Street Journal 2010).  
In November of 2002, residents of Florida voted to ban the use of gestation crates in the 
hog industry. Results of the vote outcome indicated that 55% of the residents in Florida believed 
that gestation crates were detrimental to hogs animal welfare. After the vote was shown to pass, 
producers in the pork industry were given until November 2008, approximately six years to phase 
out the use of gestation crates in the hog industry. Following Florida’s lead in 2006, Arizona 
implemented Proposition 204, also known as Humane Treatment of Farm Animals Act. Similarly, 
this initiative also banned the use of the use of gestation crates in the Arizona hog industry. This 
measure passed with approximately 62% of voters voting in favor of the initiative. The Treatment 
of Farm Animals Act implemented as of January 1, 2013, gave producers in the pork industry 
approximately seven years to convert to production practices that adhere to such laws. Due to 
these laws being implemented, consumers and producers in Florida and Arizona have observed a 
cost increase in pork production. 
 Although individuals have been shown to be more likely to vote in favor of ballot 
initiatives perceived to improve animal welfare, many consumers in the United States have been 
indicated they are not willing to pay higher prices for pork products as a result from enacting the 
new laws. Using a contingent valuation approach, Tonsor, Wolf, and Olynk (2009) surveyed 
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United States citizens in order to gauge consumer perceptions, preferences, and voting behavior. 
Results of this study concluded participants to have a WTP of approximately $230 per year in 
higher taxes in order to ban the use of gestation crates. Thus, suggesting the overall United States 
population would have a WTP of approximately $25,246 million per year in aggregate taxes to 
support such a ban. Initially a large majority of participants voted in favor of banning gestation 
crates, with roughly 69% of individuals voting in favor of the ban. However, when individuals 
were informed of the tax increase, the support fell from 69% to 31%. Therefore, indicating that 
although the majority of individuals would like to improve animal welfare conditions, the cost 
increase to consumers is much more than their WTP (Tonsor, Wolf, and Olynk 2009).   
Influence of Bans to Other States 
As previously mentioned by Norwood and Lusk (2011), California is a “trend setting” state. 
Many laws California implements tend to find their way to being implemented in other states. 
This could be one of the main reason why advocacy groups, such as the HSUS, tend to heavily 
push animal welfare ballot initiatives in these “trend setting” states. (Norwood and Lusk 2011). 
Using various demographic variables (e.g. wealth, gender, political affiliation, religion, and 
ethnicity) obtained from the Proposition 2 voting records, Smithson et al. (2014) constructed a 
regression model to predict which states would be most likely to vote in support of an initiative 
similar to Proposition 2 if placed on a voting ballot. According to Smithson et al. (2014), the top 
five states most likely to vote in support of an initiative were: (1) Maryland, (2) Louisiana, (3) 
New York, (4) New Jersey and (5) Massachusetts (Smithson et al. 2014).  
 Interestingly, the state of Massachusetts will hold a vote similar to California’s 
Proposition 2 in November of 2016. This ban will include regulations for hen, hog, and calve 
confinement. Unlike California, Massachusetts is not a large producer of eggs in the United 
States; therefore, the ban – if passed –is presumed to have very little effect to consumers outside 
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of the state. However, similar to California, all eggs imported to Massachusetts must adhere to the 
rules and regulations of the ballot initiative. As a result, if the ban is approved, Massachusetts is 
very likely to observe an increase in egg prices (Malone and Lusk 2016; Mullaly and Lusk 2016). 
As indicated by Malone and Lusk (2016), states which implement bans on battery cages will 
observe an increase in eggs prices ranging anywhere from 30% to 70%.      
Demographic Factors 
Various demographic attributes have been indicated to influence a voter’s decision to support or 
oppose a ballot initiative. Three separate studies have been conducted using regression models in 
order to examine various demographics that may influence animal welfare voting decisions. 
Bovay and Sumner (2013) and Smithson et al. (2014) studied the voting result of California and 
Videras (2006) studied the voting results of Florida; all using county level vote outcome data.  
 Findings suggest voters from urban areas have a much higher probability of voting in 
favor of ballot initiatives increasing regulations on animal production practices, relative to voters 
in rural areas (Videras 2006; Bovay and Sumner 2013). Bovay and Sumner (2013) suggest voters 
living in urban areas have a higher probability of voting in support, unlike rural areas, because 
residence of urban communities tend to be much more disconnected with agricultural production 
practices (Bovay and Sumner 2013). On the other hand, individuals living in agriculturally 
dependent rural areas are more likely to vote in a manner that favors producers.  
Although voters from rural areas have a higher probability of opposing animal welfare 
ballot initiatives, this is not always the case. Videras (2006) suggests voters in rural areas, who 
are more concerned about property value, could have voted in favor of the animal welfare 
initiative in order to achieve an increase in their property value. The reasoning for this is: 
property values in rural areas are shown to decrease when in close proximity of a hog farm. The 
decrease in property value can be attributed to pollution of pesticides and manure of large hog 
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farms (Videras 2006). Another possible reason rural voters might vote in favor is due to the fact 
that less than 2% of individuals in the United States are involved in agricultural. Many 
individuals, even some of those whom live in rural agriculturally dependent communities, do not 
typically understand the costly effects of passing such initiatives (Lusk 2016). This was shown, as 
a surprise in various agriculturally dependent counties of California. For example Kern County, 
which is heavily involved in agriculture, voted with over 50% in favor of passing Proposition 2.   
 Socioeconomic attributes affect the way in which an individual chooses to cast their vote 
as well. It is a concern that consumers in lower socioeconomic classes may now not be able to 
purchase the products that they once were able to afford (Lusk and Norwood 2011). With the rise 
in prices by reason of production cost increases, many of these products may now not be feasible 
to purchase due to the consumers’ budget constraints. If the consumer is aware that there will be a 
cost increase to products due to the ban on production practice, consumers are more likely to 
oppose the animal welfare initiative. Bovay and Sumner (2013) and Smithson et al. (2014) 
observed in the California voting outcome data, that income level has a significant impact on the 
way in which an individual votes in regards to animal welfare initiative. It was indicated as per 
capita income decreases, support for Proposition 2 simultaneously decreases amongst voters. 
Political party affiliation and loyalty has been shown to play a vital role in the decision 
making of a referendum on ballot initiatives. Observed by Bovay and Sumner (2013), Videras 
(2006) and Smithson et al. (2014), all studies concluded individuals who identify themselves as a 
member of the Democratic Party show a higher probability of voting in support of a ban, as 
opposed to those who did not. Using the 2008 Obama/McCain presidential election results from 
California, the regression from Bovay and Sumner (2013) indicated that as the share support for 
McCain observed an increase of 10 percentage points, the share support for Proposition 2 
decreased by 3.82 percentage points (Bovay and Sumner 2013). Similar to Bovay and Sumner 
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(2013), Smithson et al. (2014) found that counties who primarily voted in favor of Obama in 
California were shown to be more likely to vote in support of a ban.   
Videras (2006) ran a regression model using the 1996 presidential election outcomes in 
Florida, which indicated a county’s percentage vote for Clinton/Gore (Democratic Party 
Candidates). The regression indicated a positive correlation amongst voting in support of 
Clinton/Gore and in support of the animal welfare initiative with an estimation that for every 10% 
increase in support for Clinton/Gore raises the odds ratio to support animal welfare initiatives by 
5.7%. Videras (2006) suggests that this could be due to liberals supporting a larger government 
role in regulations. 
In 2008, the California Democratic Party (CDP) endorsed the Proposition 2 ballot 
initiative. Due to the CDP endorsement of the ballot initiative, it is suggested that some voters 
voted in alignment with their political party rather than their view on the actual ballot initiative 
(Bovay and Sumner 2013).  
Smithson et al. (2014) and Videras (2006) both found religion to play an important role in 
the way individuals vote. In the Smithson et al. (2014) study, Protestants were shown to have a 
significant impact on the way in predicting which states would implement a ban. Louisiana and 
Mississippi were shown to rank second and seventeenth amongst all states predicted to implement 
a ban, respectively. However, when comparing Louisiana and Mississippi, residents of both states 
observe similar demographic make-up. The only difference is that Louisiana contains mostly 
Catholic and Mississippi was shown to be primary Protestant. When the Protestant variable was 
exchanged for Catholic in Mississippi, Mississippi rose from 55% to 74% support. Therefore, 
causing Mississippi to move up in the rankings from seventeenth to first in the United States to be 
the next state to implement a ban. Thus, concluding religion plays a significant factor in the way 
individuals tend to vote (Smithson et al. 2014). Similarly Videras (2006) found in Florida that 
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Catholics were much more likely to vote in support of a ban. On the other hand, individuals 
considered Evangelical were shown to vote in opposition of a ballot initiative imposing a ban 
with almost double the effect. Videras (2006) suggests Evangelicals vote in opposition is because 
individuals who are considered Evangelical are more likely to take a more literal interpretation of 
the bible, unlike Catholics who take a less literal approach to bible messages.   
Citizen vs. Consumer 
The citizen vs. consumer hypothesis claims, individuals who participate in surveys concerning 
political issues tend to answer them as a “citizen” rather than as a “shopper”, or “consumer”. 
Many individuals tend to embrace the “citizen”, or homo politicus, approach when participating 
in surveys and vote how as a “model citizen” of a community to improve the community as a 
whole –commonly known as expressing altruistic preferences.  In contrast, the demeanor in 
which an individual makes private decisions as a “consumer”, known as homo economicus, 
solely benefits their personal utility. Blamey, Common, and Quiggin (1995) observed that when 
individuals are prompted with contingent valuation questionnaires using hypothetical situations 
concerning environment preservation, participants are typically using their “citizen” judgment – 
as opposed to how they would make their decision privately as a “consumer” (Blamey, Common 
and Quiggin 1995; Nyborg 2000).  
Many times, preferences revealed in the ballot box do not seem to reflect voters’ 
consumer behavior in the marketplace (Brennan and Lomasky 1993). Brennan and Lomasky 
(1993) observed that individuals derive utility from two components. The first component, known 
as expressive preferences, indicates individuals derive utility from voting or purchases in a 
particular manner. The second component, known as instrumental preferences, derives utility 
from the price at which they purchase an item. In the voting booth, individuals will use their 
expressive preferences in vesting their vote in order to obtain a “feel good” sensation per se – 
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regardless of the outcome of the ballot initiative. In this instance, expressive preferences 
primarily dictates the individual’s vote and purchase decision. On the hand, instrumental 
preferences – as observed in the marketplace – are shown to have little importance in the 
individual’s vote and purchase decision (Brennan and Lomasky 1993). This is an example of a 
“citizen” voting in a manner believed to increase the overall utility of society. On the other hand, 
privately as a “consumer” individuals purchase in a manner that increases their consumer utility; 
in many instances not reflecting their vote decision (Ovaskainen and Kniivilä 2005). By this 
standard, this could be a potential reason behind the large “gap” among voting decisions and 
purchasing choices. 
In these various instances, individuals behave and act in a manner believed to improve 
the overall wellbeing of the community. However, this altruistic demeanor can vary amongst 
different individuals. The altruistic value for some individuals may be that all individuals should 
have the right to decide what they choose to purchase; therefore, voting in opposition of 
initiatives limiting the variety of products an individual can purchase. However, on the other 
hand, altruistic values of an individual may be that individuals must have the “best quality” 
products; therefore, voting in favor of the initiative – due to the fact many individuals perceive 
specialty eggs are as healthier for consumer consumption and improving animal welfare (Blamey, 
Common and Quiggin 1995; Ovaskainen and Kniivilä 2005; Brooks and Lusk 2012). 
In the case of purchasing eggs and voting on egg production practice initiatives, Brooks 
and Lusk (2012) claim, “individuals may support public policies more than private shopping 
choices suggest because of differences in social and personal preferences.” (Brooks and Lusk 
2012) Certain issues may be that of public safety. If an individual believes that passing a law with 
improve the safety of other consumers, then individuals act as a citizen and support the initiative 
in order to improve the wellbeing of others. This could be due to animal treatment, ethical, or 
religious values (Carlsson, Frykblom and Lagerkvist 2007). However, Carlsson, Frykblom and 
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Lagerkvist (2007) designed a choice experiment, using participants from the European Union 
(EU), in order to assess whether or not consumers preferred genetically modified (GM) foods to 
be banned for all individuals or if consumers would rather avoid purchasing foods with a GM 
label. From this research, results indicated no difference amongst consumers’ disinclination to 
GM foods and WTP to ban GM foods from the marketplace. Thus, Carlsson, Frykblom, and 
Lagerkvist (2007) concluded that individuals reluctance towards GM foods is not an issue of 
public welfare or and a perceived externality, as opposed to acting as a “citizen” when voting and 
a “consumer” when shopping. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
 
There are several non-mutually exclusive hypotheses that have been put forth (or are developed 
here) to explain why people may vote in ways that appear contradictory with the way they shop.  
This chapter outlines a few of these hypotheses.   
 Using California as an example, Proposition 2 gathered 63.5% of votes in support of 
banning the use of battery cages in egg production. Although the majority of individuals 
supported Proposition 2, approximately 90% of eggs consumed in California were from cage egg 
production systems. With the majority of individuals voting in favor of Proposition 2 and 
consuming eggs from hens in cage production systems, it is plausible that some individuals voted 
in a manner that eliminated eggs they regularly purchase in the marketplace; therefore, creating a 
vote-buy gap between their purchase choice and vote decision. In conducting this non-
hypothetical experiment involving real food, real shopping choices, real votes, and real money – 
which mimics “real world” choices and decisions – it is believed that a vote-buy gap will be 
observed. From this arises the first hypothesis, known as the Vote-Buy Gap Replication 
Hypothesis. 
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Vote-Buy Gap Replication Hypothesis: The vote-buy gap, as observed in animal welfare ballot 
initiative voting results, can be replicated in an experimental lab setting. 
It is possible that many consumers are unaware that they are purchasing products that do 
not meet the production practice standards proposed by a ballot initiative. The average consumer 
believes that 37% of eggs sold in grocery stores are from caged production practice systems, 
while 90% of the market is from cage production practice systems (Norwood and Lusk 2011). If 
this is true, it would explain why purchasing choices do not coincide with voting decisions; 
namely, people believe they are being consistent when in fact they are not.  Another line of 
evidence in support of this conjecture is provided by responses to the March 2015 Food Demand 
Survey (FooDS) conducted by Lusk and Murray (2015). After describing the vote-buy gap that 
occurred in California, over 1,000 respondents were asked why they thought the gap existed.  
Participants could type any response they desired, and responses were categorized according to 
possible explanations. The most commonly mentioned issue was a lack of information 
(mentioned by 27% of respondents): people did not know they were buying cage eggs in the 
grocery store, and they said they wouldn't have bought them if they knew more.  Example 
responses to the question of why the vote-buy gap exists include "Because they did not realize 
what they were purchasing" and "shoppers didn't know that eggs were coming from small caged 
hens" and "Most people don't understand where their food comes from."  Thus, the second 
hypothesis, termed the Knowledge Hypothesis, is: 
Knowledge Hypothesis: The vote-buy gap is caused by the fact that consumers believe 
they are buying cage-free produced eggs when in fact they are buying cage produced 
eggs; better information about housing practices when shopping will reduce the vote-buy 
gap.   
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Many consumers of controversial agricultural products are voters; however, not all voters 
are consumers of controversial agricultural products. For example, many individuals who are 
vegetarian or vegan and do not buy meat or eggs; however, they may vote in favor of initiatives 
similar to that of Proposition 2. In this instance, a vegan can attain an outcome they desire by 
banning caged eggs with no cost to themselves.  More generally, if “heavy eaters” of eggs and 
meat differ from “light eaters” in terms of their views on animal welfare and preferences for 
policies that restrict animal housing practices, the market share for cage-free produced eggs will 
diverge from the vote share in favor of banning cage produced eggs.  Under this line of reasoning, 
the vote-buy gap is something of an illusion because, proverbially speaking, apples are being 
compared to oranges.  That is, every shopper can buy in a manner consistent with their vote, and 
yet at the aggregate level a vote-buy gap can arise.  This happens for three inter-related reasons: 
1) when calculating a vote share each voter is weighted equally whereas a market share weights 
shoppers by their volume and frequency of purchase, 2) some voters may not buy (or may 
infrequently buy) the products affected, and 3) a selection effect that could arise if the preferences 
of the typical voter diverges from that of the typical shopper. This discussion leads to the third 
hypothesis, termed he Non-Buyer Hypothesis: 
Non-Buyer Hypothesis: The vote-buy gap is caused by the fact that the people who buy a 
product do not perfectly represent the people who vote on bans affecting the product; the 
vote-buy gap will fall once non-buyers are removed from the sample of voters.   
Building off arguments by Norwood and Lusk (2011), Bovay and Sumner (2014) develop 
a conceptual model that explains the vote-buy gap as resulting from a free-rider problem.  When 
shopping for eggs an individual’s decision only affects them and has only a minuscule effect on 
the life of a hen.  By contrast, when voting in a state-wide ballot initiative, an individuals’ vote 
has the potential to affect every person and every hen in the state.  Presuming individuals have 
some altruistic preferences toward other people and animals, a vote affecting many animals and 
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people has a different cost-benefit ratio than a single purchase decision.  This leads to the fourth 
hypothesis called the Public Good Hypothesis.   
Public Good Hypothesis: The vote-buy gap is caused by the fact that more animals and 
people benefit from a ban than does a single shopping choice for cage free eggs; as the 
size of the group affected by a vote increases, individuals are more likely to vote in favor 
of the initiative, thereby increasing the vote-buy gap. 
Another hypothesis, which is confounded with the Public Good Hypothesis was 
developed by Brennan and Lomansky (1993).  They posit that an individual’s utility from 
undertaking an action is comprised of two components, an instrumental value that comes directly 
from paying for and consuming the good and an expressive value that comes from the action of 
voting or purchasing in a particular way – it is the psychological pleasure one gets from voting to 
ban cage eggs or buying cage free eggs (e.g., the feeling of being a “good person” or “looking 
good” or “doing the right thing”)  independent of the actual consumption value of cage free eggs 
or the effects of a cage ban on chickens or humans.  In this sense, expressive preferences are 
similar to the concept of “selfish” warm glow that is argued to motivate giving behavior 
(Andreoni, 1990).  In this model, the divergence in voting and shopping outcomes occurs because 
a shopping choice is decisive whereas a vote is not.  In fact, if the group size is large, the 
probability of an individual’s vote deciding the outcome is vanishingly small.  In this case, the 
instrumental preference is of minor consequence and the expressive preference dominates.  By 
contrast, in a shopping choice, the two are on even playing field.  As Brennan and Lomansky 
(1993, p. 24)  put it, “The relative price of expressive elements in any act of choice measured in 
terms of instrumental benefits forgone, is higher in markets than in electoral settings.  As we 
move from the marketplace to the ballot box, all other things equal, the relative significance of 
expressive elements increases by a factor equal to the inverse probability of being decisive.” This 
leads us to the fifth hypothesis, called the Expressive Voting Hypothesis: 
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Expressive Voter Hypothesis: The vote-buy gap is caused by the fact that in large groups, 
an individual’s votes is unlikely to be a deciding factor, privileging expressive preferences over 
instrumental preferences; as a group size increases, and the likelihood an individual’s vote is 
consequential and decisive, individuals are more likely to vote in favor of the initiative, thereby 
increasing the vote-buy gap. 
The Public Good Hypothesis and Expressive Voter Hypothesis yield the same prediction: 
that the vote-buy gap is increasing in group size.  Thus, in most real-world applications the two 
competing hypothesis are confounded, as they are in our experiment (to be described in the next 
section).  It is possible to imagine experimental designs that could distinguish between the two 
hypotheses.  For example, one could alter the probability a market choice was binding without 
changing the number of other people or animals affected to more definitively test the Expressive 
Voter Hypothesis, although this would be an odd decision frame without real-world parallel.  It is 
also worth mentioning that the Public Good Hypothesis and the Expressive Voter Hypothesis are 
closely related to the citizen vs. consumer hypothesis mentioned in the literature review (Blamey, 
Common and Quiggin, 1995).  Our assessment is that the citizen vs. consumer moniker is just 
another name for the vote-buy gap, whereas the Public Good Hypothesis and the Expressive 
Voter Hypothesis are well articulated, and potentially testable, reasons for the gap. 
It is well known that there are instances where people herd or trend, follow the lead of 
others, and face pressure to conform to social norms.  For example, providing homeowners with 
information on their energy use compared to their neighbors can reduce energy use (Ayres, 
Raseman, and Shih, 2012; Allcott, 2011); hotel guests are more likely to reuse towels if asked to 
join other guests in reusing towels (Goldstein et al., 2007).  In the case of animal welfare, there 
were numerous campaign ads and editorials leading up to Proposition 2, which influenced 
consumer preferences and increased demand for cage free and organic eggs (Lusk, 2010).  
Because votes are often accompanied by such public pronouncements and polling information in 
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the news (whereas shopping behavior is not), this phenomenon could a cause of the divergence in 
voting and shopping behavior. This leads us to the sixth hypothesis, referred to as the Bandwagon 
Hypothesis: 
Bandwagon Hypothesis: The vote-buy gap is caused by the greater availability of public 
information about others’ behavior and the desire to socially conform; when information 
is provided on others’ voting oncomes, people will be more likely to vote in favor, 
increasing the vote-buy gap.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
Overview 
This study tests for the existence of a vote-buy gap, and the sensitivity of the gap to the factors 
mentioned in the previous chapter, by conducting a non-hypothetical experiment involving real 
food, real shopping choices, real votes, and real money. At the end of the experiment, a 
questionnaire was given to the participants to assess the demographic make-up of the sample, and 
to determine how voting and purchasing patterns varied with demographics and other beliefs and 
attitudes. 
Sample 
In order to conduct this research experiment, an invitation to participate in the experiment in 
exchange for $10 was sent via e-mail to 6,000 randomly selected students at Oklahoma State 
University, ranging from freshmen to graduate students.  Of the 6,000 surveys sent, a total 342 
participants completed their surveys. Resulting in 5.7% rate of return on the surveys.  
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Experiment Treatments 
The initial 5,000 participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatments. After the results 
of the ballot initiative vote were determined, the polling results of the vote outcome from 
Treatments 2 & 4 were shown to the additional 1,000 participants assigned to Treatments 5 & 6 
respectively, prior to the vote section. Treatments 5 & 6 used the polling information from 
Treatments 2 & 4 respectively, because all treatment conditions – except for polling information 
given – were identical. The variations amongst the six treatments as shown in Table 1 on page 54 
are listed as follows: Treatment 1(Control) – Brand shown, no previous polling information 
given, and five participants to a group; Treatment 2 – Brand shown, no previous polling 
information given, and 51 participants to a group; Treatment 3 – Brand & practice shown, no 
previous polling information given, and five participants to a group; Treatment 4 – Brand & 
practice shown, no previous polling information given, and 51 participants to a group; Treatment 
5 – Brand only, polling information from vote outcome of Treatment 2, and 51 participants to a 
group; Treatment 6 – Brand & practice shown, polling information from vote outcome of 
Treatment 4, and 51 participants to a group.  
Data Collection and Survey Procedures 
Although the experiment was non-hypothetical, in an effort to increase participation and sample 
size, individuals were allowed to participate online at their convenience, and then collect their 
participation fee and food at a later date.  At the beginning of the experiment, participants were 
reminded of their $10.00 compensation and were given a randomly assigned ID number for 
anonymity purposes.  Participants were asked several questions to ensure they understood the task 
was non-hypothetical and to check that the remembered their ID number and knew where to pick 
up their money and food.  A complete copy of the experiment instructions and decision sheets 
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(exported from the online version to paper format) is available in the appendix beginning on page 
64. 
Respondents were first asked to make a shopping choice.  They were asked to select a 
snack option selection from a list of six different food options. The choice was non-hypothetical 
and participants were able to keep any of the remaining money and their purchased snack option, 
which they were able to pick up at a later set time and date. The six different snack options as 
shown on the survey can be viewed in the appendix and were listed as follows: (1) a chocolate 
chip cookie baked using cage-free eggs from Marketside Brand Eggs at a price of $2.00, (2) a 
chocolate chip cookie baked using cage-free eggs from Farm House Brand Eggs at a price of 
$2.00, (3) a chocolate chip cookie baked using caged eggs from Great Day Eggs Farm Brand 
Eggs at a price of $1.00, (4) a chocolate chip cookie baking using caged eggs from Market Brand 
Eggs at a price of $1.00, (5) a granola bar option – which contained no egg products and was used 
to represent a vegetarian or vegan option – at a price of $1.00, or (6) none of the above and the 
participants keeps the $10.00.  
Cookies baked with different types of eggs were used to gauge consumer preferences for 
eggs. Cookies baked containing eggs were used, as opposed to scrambled eggs, an omelet or just 
simply an egg, because cookies have a longer shelf life and are easier to distribute among 
participants. Typically, when purchasing cookies, consumers may not think about the type of eggs 
used to bake cookies. In order to make the type of egg the main focus, wording of the survey 
explicitly stated eggs were used in the cookie ingredients and specifically asked participants 
which type of eggs they would prefer in their cookie option. Thus, allowing to gauge participants’ 
preferences of eggs by observing their snack selection.    
Once the participants chose their snack option, participants were informed of their group 
size of either five or fifty-one depending on the treatment they were assigned. Group sizes of five 
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and fifty-one were used for three reasons: (1) an increase in group size from five to fifty-one is 
assumed to be large enough of an increase to observe how group size alters consumer vote 
decisions, (2) these two group sizes are the most reasonable size for the anticipated sample size, 
and (3) odd group sizes will always result with a majority vote outcome.     
After the snack option was selected, participants were then prompted to vote in support or 
opposition of a ballot initiative worded in manner similar to that of California’s Proposition 2 
(2008). The ballot initiative as shown in the survey can be found in the appendix on page 71, and 
read as follows: STANDARDS FOR CONFINING FARM ANIMALS – Requires that chicken 
eggs used to make cookies in your group come from a system where hens are confined only in 
ways that allow these animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around 
freely. Please select whether you support or oppose this proposition. 
 Once the participants read the ballot initiative, they then selected their decision to support 
or oppose the given ballot initiative. The two voting options given in the survey can be viewed in 
the appendix and reads as follows: Option 1 – Support the requirement that sales of cookies 
containing chicken eggs in my group meet the confinement standards and Option 2 – Oppose 
requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet the confinement 
standards.  
After the participants selected their voting decision, participants were then prompted with 
a second set of snack option to choose from in the instance the ballot initiative passed. However, 
the only available snack options were snacks using products that would adhere to the production 
practice regulations implemented by the ballot initiative. If the ballot initiative was shown to pass 
with 50% or more of the participants per treatment voting in support of the ban, participants 
would be bound with their purchase from the second set of snack options. On the other hand, if 
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the ballot initiative was not shown to pass, participants would be bound with their purchase from 
the first set of snack options. 
 
Both snack selections and the voting decision were conducted all in one survey, as 
opposed to separate sessions and/or in real-time in order to obtain a larger sample. Conducting the 
survey in one session allowed participants to complete their survey at their own desired time and 
convenience. If the survey was segmented into various sessions (i.e. first purchase, vote, and 
second purchase), it is possible some participants would not be able or willing to participate in 
later sessions. Similarly, if the experiment was conducted in real-time, many participants may 
have not been able to participate during the real-time session, due to a conflict in their daily 
schedules. Therefore, conducting the experiment in a single session allowed participants to 
complete the survey at their own convenience; ultimately, resulting in a larger amount of 
completed surveys.   
At the end of the survey, an additional questionnaire was given to participants. This 
questionnaire was used to assess the different demographic make-up of the participants across all 
treatments. The results to the answers on the questionnaire were used to observe if any other 
factors cause an individual to vote in a certain manner, besides solely observing their purchase 
decision.  
Logistic Model Predicting Voting Outcomes 
Two logistic models were estimated in order to test the hypotheses. The first logistic model 
created was used to determine the probability that an individual would vote in support of the 
ballot initiative based on their treatment and snack selection. The dependent variable in this 
model was denoted as Vote, with 1 indicating the participant would vote in favor of the ballot 
initiative and 0 indicating that the participant would vote in opposition of the ballot initiative. The 
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explanatory variables used in the logistic model were denoted as CAT which takes the value of 1 
if an individual chose the cookie option using eggs from cage hens, CFT which takes the value of 
1 if an individual chose the cookie option using eggs from cage-free hens, GR which takes the 
value of 1 if an individual chose the granola option, None which was dropped from the model in 
order to avoid singularity amongst the snack options, N as the participants’ group size (taking the 
value of either 5 or 51) , Social is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if previous polling 
result information was given prior to the voting decision, and Prac is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the production practice system was clearly labeled shown in the snack selection description. 
The logistic model for Model 1 is shown as follows: 
 
(1)            𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 = 1)
=
exp (∝0+ 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑇 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑁 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑐)
1 + exp (∝0+ 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑇 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑁 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑐)
 
 
Using the coefficients we can test the hypothesis by examining if the parameter estimates 
values are negative or positive and statistically significant. If the value of the parameter estimates 
for a particular variable is positive, this indicates that participant will be more likely to vote in 
support of the ballot initiative. On the other hand, if the value of the parameter estimate is shown 
to be negative, this indicates that the participant will be more likely to vote in opposition of the 
ballot initiative. For example, if the value given for the parameter estimate for cage-free option is 
positive, then this indicates that individuals who purchased the cage-free option are more likely to 
vote in support of the ballot initiative. Another example is group size, if the parameter estimate 
for group size is shown to be positive then this indicates that as group size increases, so does the 
probability participants will vote in support of the ballot initiative.  
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We estimated several versions of equation 1.  After the results from the Model 1 were 
calculated, using only the snack selection and treatments, additional variables were added to test 
for the robustness of the results.  The additional variables used were acquired from the results of 
the questionnaire distributed at the end of the experimental survey. This questionnaire helped 
further assess the various demographics of the participants by asking  political affiliation, gender, 
ethnicity, roles of government regulation, most important food characteristic (e.g. price, 
anticipated taste, healthfulness, production practice, safety), college of study at Oklahoma State 
University, and personal beliefs (e.g. imposing beliefs on others, product knowledge, voting 
affects).Using the additional information collected from the questionnaire, five additional logistic 
models were created in order to assess the any additional demographic influences that could 
possibly effect participants voting decision.  
Using Model 1 as a base model, Model 1.2 was created by adding the additional 
explanatory variables to assess if political affiliation influences the manner in which an individual 
chooses to vote on the ballot initiative. The participants were given the following options to 
identify their political affiliation: extremely liberal, slightly liberal, moderate, slightly 
conservative and extremely conservative. Dummy variables with a value of 1 or 0, 1 indicating 
the participants’ political selection and 0 indicating otherwise, were used to indicate the political 
selection in which the participant most commonly identifies. The extremely conservative variable 
was dropped to avoid singularity among the political identification variables. Gender was also 
assessed in Model 1.2, using dummy variables with a value of 1 to indicate if the participant was 
female and 0 to indicate if the participant was male. 
 Using Model 1.2, Model 1.3 was created by adding ethnicity explanatory variables in 
order to determine if participants’ ethnicity would influence any purchase or voting decisions. 
The ethnicity options were listed as follows: White, Black, Hispanic, Native American, Asian, 
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and Other. Dummy variables with a value of 1 or 0, 1 
30 
 
indicating the participants’ ethnicity and 0 indicating otherwise, were used to indicate the 
ethnicity in which the participant most commonly identifies. The other variable was dropped in 
order to avoid singularity among the ethnicity variables.     
Using Model 1.3, Model 1.4 was created by adding additional explanatory variables 
regarding how participants view the government’s role in food consumption and the most 
important food characteristic when selecting their food options. In order to determine how 
participants view the role of government in food consumption, the participants were asked, “Do 
you agree or disagree that the government should advise consumers on what to eat/drink?” Along 
with this question they were given five answers, shown with their correlated number values, listed 
as follows: (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) somewhat 
disagree, or (5) strongly disagree. 
In addition to determining the government’s role in food consumption, the participants 
were also asked to answer which food characteristic is most important when selecting food 
products. The characteristics given are listed as follows: price, anticipated taste, healthfulness, 
production practice (e.g. cage-free, organic, caged, color of egg), and food safety (e.g. low risk of 
food-borne illness). Dummy variables were assigned to the variables with the values of 1 or 0, 
with 1 indicating the most important characteristic of food products to the participant, 0 
indicating otherwise. The food safety variable was dropped in order to avoid singularity among 
the food characteristic variables.   
Using Model 1.4, Model 1.5 was created by adding explanatory variables in relation to 
the college the participant is attending at Oklahoma State University. The various colleges listed 
are the College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources, College of Education, College of 
Engineering, Architecture & Technology, College of Human Sciences, Spears School of 
Business, Center for Veterinary Health Sciences, College of Arts & Sciences, and other. Dummy 
31 
 
variable with a value of 1 or 0 were assigned in order to indicate the selection of the participant, 
with 1 indicating the college of study the participant is attending and zero indicating otherwise. 
The College of Arts & Sciences was dropped in order to avoid singularity among the college of 
study variables.  
Lastly, using model 1.5, Model 1.6 was created by adding explanatory variables in 
regards to participants’ individual beliefs and a variable indicating if they picked-up their 
purchase at a later set date during the pick-up times. The way in which individuals beliefs were 
assessed was by asking two different types of questions. One type of question was simple yes or 
no questions and the other types of questions used a ranking scale in which the participant select 
either strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly 
disagree in relation to the statement. For the yes and no questions, dummy variables were used 
with 1 representing the “yes” answers and 0 representing the “no” answers. The various yes or no 
questions are listed as follows: (1) if the prices were to be raised on each product by $2, would 
you have spent the $10 in the same way? , (2) do you agree or disagree: I don’t like imposing my 
views on my group members? , and (3) when selecting my purchase option, I knew which brands 
contained cage-free chicken eggs and which brands did not. 
The ranking questions gave a value to each answer in order to indicate which answer the 
participant selected. The ranking scale used values from 1-5, with 1 indicating strongly agree and 
5 indicating strongly disagree. The participants were asked if they agree or disagree to the 
following statements: I considered how my vote may affect other individuals’ purchase options, I 
believe my vote did not matter in this study and the voting outcome would have been the same 
regardless of my voting decision, I don’t like imposing my views on my group members, the 
outcome of the vote will be fair, and I feel that my vote had a positive impact on production 
practices and animal welfare.  
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The last variable added to Model 1.6 indicated if the participant picked-up their purchase 
at the later scheduled pick-up time. This was indicated by using dummy variables of 1 or 0, which 
1 indicated that the individual picked-up their purchase and 0 indicated those participants who did 
not pick-up their purchase.  
Logistic Model Predicting Vote-Buy Gap. 
The second logistic model was created to predict the probability that an individual would vote in 
a manner opposite of their purchase. However, this model only used participants who chose the 
caged or cage-free cookie option from the first snack selection. The reasoning for this is because 
the caged and cage-free cookie options are the only options in which an individual can vote in a 
manner which does not reflect their purchase, unlike the selecting the granola or the none option. 
This allowed for calculation of the probability for the vote/buy gap. The dependent variable in 
this model was denoted as OpVote, with 1 indicating the participant would vote in a manner 
which is not aligned with their purchase (e.g. purchase caged cookie/vote in support, purchase 
cage-free cookie/vote in opposition) and 0 indicating that the participant would vote in a manner 
which does reflect their purchase. All explanatory variables, excluding GR and None, remained 
the same as in Model 1. The logistic model for Model 2 is shown as follows: 
 
(2)            𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑂𝑝𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 = 1)
=
exp (𝛾0 + 𝛿1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑇 + 𝛿2 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑇 + 𝛿3 ∗ 𝑁 + 𝛿4 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝛿5 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑐)
1 + exp (𝛾0 + 𝛿1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑇 + 𝛿2 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑇 + 𝛿3 ∗ 𝑁 + 𝛿4 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝛿5 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑐)
 
 
Similar to the first model, we can test the hypotheses using parameter estimates of the 
coefficients. If the value of the parameter estimates for a particular variable is positive, this 
indicates that participant will be more likely to create a vote-buy gap. On the other hand, if the 
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value of the parameter estimate is shown to be negative, this indicates that the participant will be 
more likely to create a vote-buy gap. For example, if a the value given for the parameter estimate 
for caged option is positive, then this indicates that individuals who purchased the caged option 
are more likely to vote in support of the ballot initiative causing a vote-buy gap. Another example 
is polling information, if the parameter estimate for production practice is shown to be positive 
then this indicates that if production practice is given, the probability participants will vote 
opposite of how they purchase increases as well.  
Once the base for Model 2 was created, additional models were created by adding the 
additional variables obtained from the questionnaire. All explanatory variables were added to 
model to in the same fashion as to Model 1. The only difference was the Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander Ethnicity and Center for Veterinary Sciences explanatory variables were dropped. These 
two variables were dropped because no participants in these two categories selected a caged or 
cage-free cookie option. Otherwise, all additional explanatory variables from Model 2.2 – Model 
2.6 reflect that of Model 1.2 – Model 1.6, respectively.   
Vote Importance 
As an experimental manipulation check to determine if participants believe their vote becomes 
more irrelevant as group size increases, participants were asked the question, “Do you agree or 
disagree: I believe my vote did not matter in this study and the voting outcome would have been 
the same regardless of my voting decision?” The participants then responded by selecting 
strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly 
disagree. Each answer was given a numeric value of 1-5, with 1 indicating strongly agree and 5 
indicating strongly disagree. Using the numeric value assigned to each answer selection, the mean 
was calculated for each individual treatment. Once the mean was calculated, it was compared 
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across all treatments to determine if individuals believed their vote becomes less important as 
group size increased.   
Consumer Turnover Rate 
Allendar and Richards (2010) suggest that because individuals will not be willing to pay for 
higher-priced egg premiums, many of the consumers will no longer purchase eggs due to the 
price increase. Because of the increase in egg prices, many individuals will be excluded from the 
marketplace. For the current study, the percentage of individuals who will no longer purchase 
eggs due to the cost increase, yet were consumers of eggs prior to the initiative passing, is 
referred to as the Consumer Turnover Rate. In order to determine the Consumer Turnover Rate, 
dummy variables were assigned to each participant who originally purchased the caged cookie 
option. If the participant was shown to have chosen a caged cookie option from their first snack 
selection and then shown to select the None option in the second snack selection, then that 
participant was assigned a value of 1, 0 if otherwise, in order to indicate that the participant was 
no longer a consumer of products containing eggs due to the more costly cookies being the only 
available. Once the participants received either a value of 1 or 0, the means were calculated to see 
the average Consumer Turnover Rate per treatment.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
RESULTS  
 
 
 
Initiative Voting Results 
The ballot initiative passed in all six treatments.  All treatments, indicated in Figure 1 on page 57, 
were shown to have support in the 61.9% – 66.67% range, except Treatment 3 with 53.73% 
support. The results of the voting outcome are shown in Figure 1 on page 57. The outcome is 
remarkably (and perhaps coincidentally) similar to the outcome of Proposition 2 in California, 
which garnered 63.5% support. Once the vote outcome was determined, the percentage of 
participants’ votes and snack options were compared. The snack options selected for the first 
snack selection (Figure 2) and second snack selection (Figure 3) can be found on pages 58 and 59 
of the appendix, respectively.  This comparison enabled a determination of whether there was a 
vote/buy gap for each participant.  
As shown in Figure 4 on page 60, results of the first purchase selection and vote choice 
indicate that there is in fact a vote-buy gap observed in all treatments. Over half of the 
participants who initially selected a cookie option made with cage eggs were shown to vote in 
support of the ballot initiative. Therefore, 50% or more of participants in each treatment who 
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purchased cookies using cage eggs voted in a manner that does not reflect their purchase, creating 
a vote-buy gap. Most interestingly was the vote-buy gap that occurred in the Control treatment. 
The results of the Control indicated that 82.61% of all the participants who purchased cookies 
using eggs from cage hens chose to vote in support of the ballot initiative. This is a huge gap of 
more than four-fifths of all cage purchases voting to ban their purchase. Treatments 3 and 6 were 
both shown to have a vote-buy gap of approximately 70%; Treatments 2, 4, and 5 all displayed a 
vote-buy gap ranging from 52.17%, 60%, and 57.14%, respectively. All indicating the majority of 
participants who purchase cookies from caged hens vote in support of the ballot initiative. On the 
other hand, the majority of participants that selected a cookie option using cage-free eggs were 
shown to be more likely to vote in a manner that reflected their purchase option.  This indicated 
that the vote-buy gap is created from individuals purchasing cage eggs and voting in support of 
banning the items that they are purchasing. As indicated from the results, a vote-buy gap is 
observed across all treatments; therefore, we can accept the Vote-Buy Gap Replication 
Hypothesis and conclude the vote-buy gap can be recreated in an experimental lab setting. 
Indications from Logistic Models 
As shown Table 2 on page 48, Model 1 indicates that when the production practice was listed on 
next to the snack selection options, the less likely participants were to vote in favor of passing the 
initiative; however, the p-values for the practice shown explanatory variable hold no value of 
significance. Therefore, we must reject the Knowledge Hypothesis and cannot claim consumers 
do not know which products they are purchasing.    
When observing the voting behavior of “non-buyers”, Figure 5 on page 61 indicates the 
majority of “non-buyers” chose to vote in support of the ballot initiative in all treatments 
excluding Treatment 3. In Treatment 3, participants who did not purchase a cookie option were 
shown to vote with 60.71% in opposition of the ballot initiative. The parameter estimates 
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observed in Model 1-Model 1.6 as shown in Table 2 on page 48 indicate the granola variable, 
relative to cage-free, indicate that “non-buyers”  choosing granola are likely to vote in opposition 
of the initiative. However, the parameter estimates for the none variable, relative to cage-free, 
indicated “non-buyer” choosing the none option are likely to vote in support of the ballot 
initiative.  Although the parameter estimates indicated “non-buyers” of granola and none were 
likely to vote in opposition and support, respectively, the p-values were shown to hold no 
significant value. Therefore, we must reject the Non-Buyer Hypothesis and cannot claim that the 
individuals who are not purchasers of egg products create a vote-buy gap by voting in support of 
bans on production practices. 
   Observing Table 2 located on page 48, Model 1 indicates that as the number of 
participants per group increases that the probability of that individual voting in support of the 
proposed initiative increases as well. Although the data shows an increase in the probability of 
voting in support when group size increases, as hypothesized in the Public Good Hypothesis, the 
p-values indicate the parameter estimates for Model 1-Model1.6 are not significant. In Table 3, 
Model 2.2-Model2.6 indicate that indicates that as group size increases, individuals are more 
likely to vote in alignment with their vote. Therefore, we must reject the Public Good Hypothesis 
and cannot claim consumers are more likely to vote in support of the ban as group size increases. 
 On the other hand, Table 3 on page 51 shows Model 2.2 – Model 2.6 indicates that 
individuals purchase the cookie option made with cage eggs, relative to cage-free, the probability 
of the participants voting in favor of a ban increases. The parameter estimates are shown to be 
significant at the 1% level and increase from 0.9664-1.8625 from Model 2 – Model 2.6, 
respectively. Observing the parameter estimates for group size, it is indicated that when group 
size increases, the probability an individual will vote opposite of their purchase is shown to 
decrease. The parameter estimates are shown to be significant at the 5% level and decrease from -
0.0181 to -0.0234 from Model 2.2 – Model 2.6, respectively. From Model 2 it can be concluded 
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at the 5% level that as group size increases the probability of individuals voting opposite of their 
purchase decreases. Therefore, using Model 2 we cannot accept the Public Good Hypothesis 
claiming that as group size increases, the vote-buy gap increases. 
 Observing the results as shown in Figure 6 on page 62, the majority of participants 
tended to disagree with the statement, “I believe my vote did not matter in this study and the 
voting outcome would have been the same regardless of my voting decision.” As indicated in 
Figure 6, all treatments were shown to have a mean ranging from 3.11-3.57, indicating not much 
changed in participants believing their vote is irrelevant due to an increase in group size.  
Although there was a slight increase to the mean by 0.15 of individuals believing their vote was 
irrelevant with the group increase from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2, this difference was too small 
to draw any conclusions. When observing the change from Treatment 3 to Treatment 4, an 
opposite effect was show with an increase to the mean by 0.08 of individuals believing that their 
vote was not irrelevant.  Overall, in all treatments participants tended to average between neither 
agree nor disagree and somewhat disagree From these results we can reject the Expressive Voter 
Hypothesis and conclude that as group size increases, individuals do not believe their vote is 
irrelevant and that there vote does count. Therefore, we cannot conclude individuals are more 
likely to vote in favor of the ballot initiative as group size increases.  
 When examining Table 2, as shown on page 48, Model 1 indicates that when participants 
were more likely to vote in favor of the proposed ballot initiative. Because both previous polling 
information shown indicated the majority of previous participants voted in support of the ban, this 
indicates that the participants did tend to follow the voting trends of others. In the same token, 
when observing Table 3, as shown on page 51, Model 2 indicates that participants were more 
likely to vote in a manner increases the vote-buy gap. However, none of the p-values were shown 
to be significant for either model. Therefore we must reject the Band Wagon Hypothesis and 
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cannot conclude that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that information on others’ votes 
influenced voting decisions.   
As shown in Figure 7, as shown on page 63 due to the initiative passing in all treatments, 
many individuals who originally would have chosen to purchase a cookie decided to select the 
None option due to the increase in cookie prices. Thus, eliminating many consumers who prior to 
the passing of the animal welfare initiative would have purchased egg products. The percentage 
ranged from 21.74 – 43.48% of consumers who would have bought a cookie using eggs from 
conventional production practices, deciding that they would rather no longer purchase any cookie 
options. Examining the outcomes of the Consumer Turnover Rate in the various treatments, it is 
evident many consumers will no longer purchase egg due to the cost increase in egg prices.  
Conclusion 
This research analyzed the choices made by 342 participants in various treatments by asking them 
to purchase a cookie option using eggs from caged hens, a cookie option using cookies from 
cage-free hens, a granola bar containing no egg products, or none of the above. After they chose 
their first snack selection option, participants voted on a ballot initiative regarding egg production 
practices which would remove all cookies options containing eggs from caged hens. Participants 
were then prompted a second snack selection option, which only had products that adhere to the 
ballot initiative standards. Once this was completed, a questionnaire was given to assess the 
demographic make-up of the participants.  
 This is the first experiment replicating the vote-buy gap in an experimental lab setting. 
Successfully replicating the vote-buy gap indicated the vote-buy gap is in fact present among 
individual vote and purchase preferences. Although the vote-buy gap was shown to be present, it 
was not indicated to be present due to the reasons hypothesized (i.e. Knowledge Hypothesis, Non-
Buyer Hypothesis, Public Good Hypothesis, Expressive Voter Hypothesis, and Bandwagon 
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Hypothesis). However, the results of the vote-buy gap are successful in demonstrating many 
consumers do not vote in a manner that reflects their purchase. As observed in this experiment, it 
can be concluded that the vote-buy gap is present and is capable of being successfully replicated 
in an experimental lab setting.  
Once the vote-buy gap was indicated, two logistic models predicting participants vote 
decision and the vote-buy gap were created. These two logistic models were used in order to test 
the hypothesis and determine why the majority of individuals vote in favor of banning 
controversial agricultural products, when the majority of consumers regularly purchase these 
controversial agricultural products. Although the data did not show the results hypothesized, other 
variables not specifically related to the hypotheses were shown to be significant. Model 1.2 – 
Model 1.6, as shown in Table 2, suggest participants who claimed to be extremely liberal – 
relative to extremely conservative – were shown to vote in favor of the ballot initiative. This 
could suggest one reason for a vote-buy gap is because individuals may be voting in a manner 
that aligns with their political affiliation, as opposed to how they would shop in the market place. 
Since extremely liberal individuals are known to align more with the Democratic Party and the 
Democratic Party has been known to endorse animal welfare legislation, this could suggest 
individuals are basing their vote decision off their political affiliation rather than their WTP for 
the product.   
Model 2.1 – Model 2.6 in Table 3 suggests that participants who purchased cookies using 
eggs from caged hens – relative to participants who purchased cookies using eggs from cage-free 
hens – are more likely to vote in a manner which does not reflect their purchase behavior. Model 
2.2 – Model 2.6 suggests that as the group size increases, participants are less likely to vote in a 
manner which does not reflect their purchase option.  This contradicts the Public Good 
Hypothesis and the Expressive Voter Hypothesis. In Model 1 it was observed that individuals who 
are not consumers of egg products are more likely to vote in favor of the ballot initiative; 
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however, the p-values were not shown to be significant. Thus, we cannot accept the Non-Buyer 
Hypothesis.  Model 1 also indicated that when consumers were shown the production practice 
used, they were more likely to vote in a manner that reflected their purchases; however, we 
cannot accept the Knowledge Hypothesis because the p-values showed no levels of significance. 
Finally, when observing the Bandwagon Hypothesis, it was indicated that participants followed 
the voting patterns from previous votes held; however, the p-values were not shown to be 
significant. Therefore, we cannot accept the Bandwagon Hypothesis. 
 The next step of this research is to attempt to conduct the experiment in multiple 
sessions. Although multiple sessions may lead to less participants completing the survey sessions, 
various sessions will allow participants more time to decide on the choices they prefer. A longer 
duration of time between purchases and vote could be more similar to a “real-world” scenario, 
because individuals typically know the initiatives they will be voting on prior to stepping into the 
ballot box; allowing individuals to possibly do research on the issue prior to casting their vote. In 
this survey, participants were immediately asked to vote right after the purchase – forcing 
participants to make quicker decisions than normal. Giving participants the ballot initiative 
information, while allowing participants a longer amount of time between purchases and vote, 
could possibly cause participants to select a different snack option and/or vote decision than 
selected in the current research experiment. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
APPENDIX – A 
 
 
 
 
 
Treatment  
Participants 
Per Treatment Treatment Name 
Group 
Size 
Production 
Practice 
Shown 
Previous 
Polling 
Info. 
1 67 Control 5 no no 
2 62 Large Group 51 no no 
3 67 
Production Practice Small 
Group 5 yes no 
4 63 
Production Practice Large 
Group 51 yes no 
5 42 Polling Info Large Group 51 no yes 
6 41 
Polling Info with Production 
Practice Large Group 51 yes yes 
Table 1. Treatment used to test hypotheses regarding the vote-buy gap.  
Note: Although the amount of participants in Treatment 5 and Treatment 6 indicated is less than 
the group size, participants believed they were in a group size of 51. Therefore, the actual amount 
of participants does not affect the decisions that participants purchase and vote.  
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Logistic Model Predicting Voting Outcomes 
Parameter         
Model 
1   
Model 
1.2   
Model 
1.3   
Model 
1.4    
Model 
1.5   
Model 
1.6  
Constant 0.0483   -0.1671   -0.9575   -0.4522   -0.1998   2.0311 
  (2.622)
a   (0.047)   (0.085)   (1.009)   (1.097)   (1.513) 
Purchased caged vs none 0.1853   0.3588   0.3477   0.3568   0.2960   0.0935 
  (0.257)   (0.280)   (0.284)   (0.293)   (0.319)   (0.358) 
Purchased cage-free vs 
none -0.2001   0.0004   0.0060   -0.0372   -0.1286   -0.6513 
  (0.304)   (0.323)   (0.326)   (0.379)   (0.394)   (0.444) 
Purchased granola vs none -0.8202   -0.3448   -0.5012   -0.5211   -0.4431   -0.9687 
  (0.931)   (1.026)   (1.054)   (1.082)   (1.124)   (1.456) 
Number of participants 
per group 0.0026   0.0045   0.0043   0.0042   0.0027   0.0017 
  (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.007) 
Production practice shown -0.2174   -0.2032   -0.1769   -0.0893   -0.1053   0.0206 
  (0.225)   (0.238)   (0.239)   (0.248)   (0.257)   (0.278) 
Previous polling 
information given 0.1314   0.1650   0.1287   0.1869   0.1613   0.1051 
  (0.299)   (0.322)   (0.338)   (0.343)   (0.354)   (0.387) 
Extremely liberal vs 
extremely conservative     1.1395*   1.1858*   1.2608*   1.1824*   1.2084* 
      (0.509)   (0.516)   (0.533)   (0.565)   (0.596) 
Slightly liberal vs 
extremely conservative     0.5197   0.5314   0.5090   0.6249   0.9410 
      (0.420)   (0.430)   (0.434)   (0.452)   (0.505) 
Moderate vs extremely 
conservative     0.6884   0.6380   0.5758   0.5725   0.6396 
      (0.400)   (0.041)   (0.416)   (0.431)   (0.480) 
Slightly conservative vs 
extremely conservative     0.7009   0.7220   0.7589   0.6708   0.8851 
      (0.407)   (0.411)   (0.417)   (0.428)   (0.465) 
Female vs male     -0.2277   -0.2125   -0.2304   -0.1298   -0.5306 
      (0.245)   (0.252)   (0.261)   (0.279)   (0.316) 
White vs other ethnicity         0.7983   0.8659   1.2442   1.7046* 
          (0.699)   (0.722)   (0.755)   (0.813) 
Black vs other ethnicity          1.0779   0.9641   1.4127   1.8200 
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          (0.989)   (1.011)   (1.037)   (1.171) 
Hispanic vs other ethnicity          0.3421   0.4109   0.6858   1.1194 
          (0.890)   (0.920)   (0.958)   (1.019) 
Native American vs other 
ethnicity          1.0838   1.1147   1.4175   1.9792 
          (0.920)   (0.938)   (0.984)   (1.116) 
Asian vs other ethnicity         0.9190   1.0632   1.4571   1.7633 
          (0.791)   (0.815)   (0.843)   (0.926) 
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander vs other ethnicity  0.5539   0.4876   0.8784   2.1074 
  (1.586)   (1.602)   (1.748)   (1.833) 
Government should advise consumers on what to 
eat/drink     -0.0889   -0.0893   -0.0356 
      (0.109)   (0.112)   (0.121) 
Price of item is the most important characteristic vs food 
safety     -0.4017   -0.3624   -0.7909 
      (0.502)   (0.520)   (0.596) 
Anticipated taste of item is the most important 
characteristic vs food safety     0.0005   0.2197   -0.4948 
      (0.565)   (0.586)   (0.665) 
Healthfulness of item is the most important characteristic 
vs food safety     -0.4164   -0.2378   -0.8619 
      (0.510)   (0.528)   (0.605) 
Production practice is the most important characteristic vs 
food safety     -0.3528   -0.2107   -0.3659 
      (0.589)   (0.611)   (0.691) 
College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources vs College of Arts & Sciences -0.6981   -0.6044 
  (0.473)   (0.502) 
College of Education vs College of Arts & Sciences -1.0705*   -1.3122* 
  (0.507)   (0.553) 
College of Engineering, Architecture, and Technology vs College of Arts & Sciences -0.1292   -0.1690 
  (0.523)   (0.561) 
College of Human Sciences vs College of Arts & Sciences - 1.670**   -1.624** 
  (0.509)   (0.527) 
Spears School of Business vs College of Arts & Sciences -0.8572   -0.9768* 
  (0.467)   (0.495) 
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Center for Veterinary Health Sciences vs College of Arts & Sciences 12.1617   10.9093 
  (771.300)   (778.000) 
Other vs College of Arts & Sciences -0.4203   -0.3675 
  (0.530)   (0.563) 
Considered how vote may affect other individuals' purchase options     -0.0972 
      (0.118) 
Purchase the same way if price increased by $2.00     -0.4349 
      (0.307) 
Believe their vote did not matter     -0.0492 
      (0.136) 
Do not like to impose their views on others     -0.088 
      (0.287) 
Outcome of the vote will be fair     -0.2774 
      (0.165) 
Vote had a positive impact on production practices and animal welfare -0.2317 
      (0.145) 
Knew which brands were cage-free eggs and which brands were caged     0.1866 
      (0.316) 
Picked up purchase selection     -0.4328 
      (0.294) 
Number of Observations 342   315   314   311   311   296 
                        
Likelihood Ratio(Pr>Chi-
Sq) 0.6413   0.4723   0.7508   0.7753   0.2457   0.1251 
            
AIC 463.007   429.999   438.936   440.067   437.024   416.306 
Note: ** and * denote 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Table 2. Logistic Model using snack selection, group size, production practice shown, polling 
information given, and other demographic explanatory variables to determine the probability an 
individual would vote in favor of the ballot initiative. 
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Logistic Model Predicting Vote Buy Gap 
Parameter         Model 2   
Model 
2.2   
Model 
2.3   
Model 
2.4    
Model 
2.5   
Model 
2.6  
Constant         -0.0013   0.0473   -1.0139   -1.2671   -1.0498   -0.7351 
          (0.3881)a   (0.604)   (1.095)   (1.353)   (1.463)   (2.033) 
Purchased caged vs cage-free 0.9664**   1.1526**   1.0753**   1.242**   1.7516**   1.8625** 
  (0.326)   (0.355)   (0.366)   (0.468)   (0.528)   (0.591) 
Number of participants per 
group -0.0135   -0.0181*   -0.0199*   -0.0199*   -0.0214*   -0.0234* 
  (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.010) 
Production practice shown 0.1816   0.1829   0.2611   0.2507   0.1389   0.4085 
  (0.317)   (0.337)   (0.347)   (0.362)   (0.386)   (0.417) 
Previous polling information 
given 0.2969   0.4200   0.5696   0.5915   0.4811   0.8639 
  (0.410)   (0.443)   (0.484)   (0.490)   (0.512)   (0.585) 
Extremely liberal vs extremely conservative -0.0865   -0.0189   -0.0612   -0.4750   -0.3977 
  (0.718)   (0.734)   (0.762)   (0.820)   (0.921) 
Slightly liberal vs extremely conservative -0.0927   -0.0229   -0.0403   -0.2524   -0.3192 
  (0.537)   (0.556)   (0.562)   (0.598)   (0.697) 
Moderate vs extremely conservative 0.1112   0.4101   0.4254   0.2820   0.5270 
  (0.506)   (0.545)   (0.554)   (0.577)   (0.720) 
Slightly conservative vs extremely conservative -0.5582   -0.3439   -0.2566   -0.4316   -0.4618 
  (0.509)   (0.525)   (0.534)   (0.561)   (0.641) 
Female vs male 0.1339   0.1272   0.1002   -0.0472   -0.2984 
  (0.338)   (0.353)   (0.363)     (0.392)   (0.458) 
White vs other ethnicity 1.1150   1.2489   1.2762   1.3202 
  (0.927)   (0.948)   (0.993)   (1.053) 
Black vs other ethnicity  1.5493   1.1680   1.2703   0.9374 
  (1.306)   (1.411)   (1.474)   (1.559) 
Hispanic vs other ethnicity  1.5493   1.8716   2.3144   2.3345 
  (1.306)   (1.391)   (1.468)   (1.586) 
Native American vs other ethnicity  0.1710   0.2613   0.4505   0.7560 
  (1.188)   (1.222)   (1.328)   (1.363) 
Asian vs other ethnicity -0.0857   0.1976   0.7926   0.4371 
  (1.110)   (1.153)   (1.223)   (1.368) 
Government should advise consumers on what to eat/drink -0.0175   -0.0260   -0.0205 
  (0.148)   (0.155)   (0.170) 
Price of item is the most important characteristic vs food safety -0.1263   0.0335   0.2047 
  (0.742)   (0.779)   (0.839) 
Anticipated taste of item is the most important characteristic vs food safety -0.0802   0.0196   0.1348 
  (0.791)   (0.818)   (0.930) 
Healthfulness of item is the most important characteristic vs food safety 0.5154   0.6211   0.5897 
  (0.795)   (0.835)   (0.878) 
Production practice is the most important characteristic vs food safety 0.2185   0.5561   0.9101 
  (0.821)   (0.853)   (0.942) 
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College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources vs College of Arts & Sciences -0.3636   -0.1749 
  (0.632)   (0.684) 
College of Education vs College of Arts & Sciences -0.1815   -0.2616 
  (0.735)   (0.830) 
College of Engineering, Architecture, and Technology vs College of Arts & Sciences -0.5628   -0.8414 
  (0.751)   (0.840) 
College of Human Sciences vs College of Arts & Sciences 1.0317   0.9289 
  (0.918)   (0.986) 
Spears School of Business vs College of Arts & Sciences -1.2974   -1.1281 
  (0.694)   (0.738) 
Other vs College of Arts & Sciences -0.3435   -0.0956 
  (0.776)   (0.844) 
Considered how vote may affect other individuals' purchase options 0.1768 
  (0.181) 
Purchase the same way if price increased by $2.00 -0.2661 
  (0.438) 
Believe their vote did not matter 0.0969 
  (0.203) 
Do not like to impose their views on others 0.3179 
  (0.433) 
Outcome of the vote will be fair -0.2205 
  (0.228) 
Vote had a positive impact on production practices and animal welfare -0.2656 
  (0.215) 
Knew which brands were cage-free eggs and which brands were not -0.3700 
  (0.521) 
Picked up purchase selection 0.1716 
  (0.172) 
Number of 
Observations         179   168   167   166   166   160 
                                
-2 Log 
Likelihood          230.604   211.449   204.896   202.238   193.938   176.173 
                
 Likelihood 
Ratio(Pr>Chi-
Sq)     0.0122   0.0427   0.0626   0.2040   0.1152   0.1880 
                
AIC         240.604   231.449   234.896   242.238   245.983   244.173 
Note: ** and * denote 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
 a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Wald Chi-Square test that all coefficients, excluding the constant, are equal to zero. 
Table 3.Logistic Model using snack selection, group size, production practice shown, polling 
information given, and other demographic explanatory variables to determine the probability an 
individual would vote in a manner which does not reflect their purchase (e.g. vote in 
support/purchase caged or vote in opposite/purchase cage-free). Thus, creating a vote/buy gap. 
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Variable Means from Logistic Model Predicting Voting Outcomes 
Variable                Amount of Participants    Mean   Std Deviation   Min Max 
Voting Decision (Vote)    342   0.623   0.485   0 1 
Purchased caged (CAT)   342   0.339   0.474   0 1 
Purchased cage-free (CFT)   342   0.184   0.388   0 1 
Purchased granola (GR)   342   0.015   0.120   0 1 
No purchase (None)   342   0.462   0.499   0 1 
People per group (N)   342   32.977   22.488   5 51 
Production practice shown (Prac)   342   0.500   0.501   0 1 
Previous polling information given (Social)   342   0.243   0.429   0 1 
Extremely liberal   315   0.114   0.319   0 1 
Somewhat liberal   315   0.213   0.410   0 1 
Politically moderate   315   0.289   0.454   0 1 
Somewhat conservative   315   0.260   0.440   0 1 
Extremely conservative   315   0.124   0.330   0 1 
Female   342   0.591   0.492   0 1 
White   337   0.715   0.452   0 1 
Black    337   0.042   0.200   0 1 
Hispanic   337   0.039   0.193   0 1 
Native American   337   0.039   0.193   0 1 
Asian   337   0.131   0.337   0 1 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander   337   0.006   0.077   0 1 
Other ethnicity   337   0.030   0.170   0 1 
Government should advise consumers on 
what to eat/drink*   335   3.110   1.202   1 5 
Price of item is the most important 
characteristic    342   0.368   0.483   0 1 
Anticipated taste of item is the most 
important characteristic   342   0.152   0.360   0 1 
Healthfulness of item is the most important 
characteristic    342   0.263   0.441   0 1 
Production practice is the most important 
characteristic   342   0.126   0.332   0 1 
Safety is the most important characteristic    342   0.079   0.270   0 1 
College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural 
Resources   337   0.175   0.381   0 1 
College of Education    337   0.116   0.320   0 1 
College of Engineering, Architecture, and 
Technology    337   0.136   0.344   0 1 
College of Human Sciences    337   0.113   0.317   0 1 
Spears School of Business    337   0.181   0.386   0 1 
Center for Veterinary Health Sciences    337   0.003   0.054   0 1 
College of Arts & Sciences   337   0.151   0.359   0 1 
Other college of study   337   0.125   0.331   0 1 
Considered how vote may affect other 
individuals' purchase options   328   2.860   1.191   1 5 
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Purchase the same way if price increased by 
$2.00   330   0.491   0.501   0 1 
Believe their vote did not matter   327   3.413   1.107   1 5 
Do not like to impose their views on others*   328   0.460   0.499   0 1 
Outcome of the vote will be fair   328   2.369   0.971   1 5 
Vote had a positive impact on production 
practices and animal welfare*   328   2.582   1.083   1 5 
Knew which brands were cage-free eggs and 
which brands were caged*   328   0.649   0.478   0 1 
Picked up purchase selection   342   0.336   0.473   0 1 
Note: * indicates questions used ranking answers with 1 = strongly agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = somewhat 
disagree, and 5 = strongly disagree.   
Table 4. Depicts the amount of participants, mean, standard deviation, and the min/max value for 
all variables used in the Logistic Model Predicting Voting Outcomes. 
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Variable Means used in Logistic Model Predicting Vote Buy Gap 
Variable                Amount of Participants    Mean   
Std 
Deviation   Min Max 
Vote Opposite of Purchase (OpVote)    342   179 0.581006 0.494779 0 1 1 
Purchased caged (CAT)   342   179 0.648045 0.47892 0 1 1 
Purchased cage-free (CFT)   342   179 0.351955 0.47892 0 1 1 
People per group (N)   342   179 32.49721 22.61932 5 51 51 
Production practice shown (Prac)   342   179 0.486034 0.501207 0 1 1 
Previous polling information given (Social)   342   179 0.24581 0.431774 0 1 1 
Extremely liberal   315   168 0.077381 0.267994 0 1 1 
Somewhat liberal   315   168 0.214286 0.411553 0 1 1 
Politically moderate   315   168 0.27381 0.447246 0 1 1 
Somewhat conservative   315   168 0.255952 0.4377 0 1 1 
Extremely conservative   315   168 0.178571 0.384138 0 1 1 
Female   342   179 0.608939 0.489357 0 1 1 
White   337   176 0.755682 0.430908 0 1 1 
Black    337   176 0.039773 0.195982 0 1 1 
Hispanic   337   176 0.034091 0.18198 0 1 1 
Native American   337   176 0.045455 0.208893 0 1 1 
Asian   337   176 0.085227 0.280016 0 1 1 
Other ethnicity   337   176 0.034091 0.18198 0 1 1 
Government should advise consumers on 
what to eat/drink*   335   176 3.0625 1.247426 1 5 5 
Price of item is the most important 
characteristic    342   179 0.374302 0.4853 0 1 1 
Anticipated taste of item is the most 
important characteristic   342   179 0.173184 0.379468 0 1 1 
Healthfulness of item is the most important 
characteristic    342   179 0.178771 0.384235 0 1 1 
Production practice is the most important 
characteristic   342   179 0.184358 0.388863 0 1 1 
Safety is the most important characteristic    342   179 0.078212 0.269259 0 1 1 
College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural 
Resources   337   176 0.25 0.434248 0 1 1 
College of Education    337   176 0.119318 0.325087 0 1 1 
College of Engineering, Architecture, and 
Technology    337   176 0.125 0.331663 0 1 1 
College of Human Sciences    337   176 0.0625 0.242752 0 1 1 
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Spears School of Business    337   176 0.181818 0.386795 0 1 1 
College of Arts & Sciences   337   176 0.102273 0.303871 0 1 1 
Other college of study   337   176 0.159091 0.366804 0 1 1 
Considered how vote may affect other 
individuals' purchase options   328   171 2.830409 1.18342 1 5 5 
Purchase the same way if price increased by 
$2.00   330   172 0.377907 0.48628 0 1 1 
Believe their vote did not matter   327   172 3.418605 1.102524 1 5 5 
Do not like to impose their views on others*   328   173 0.445087 0.498418 0 1 1 
Outcome of the vote will be fair   328   171 2.345029 0.909568 1 5 5 
Vote had a positive impact on production 
practices and animal welfare*   328   171 2.608187 1.081254 1 5 5 
Knew which brands were cage-free eggs and 
which brands were caged*   328   172 0.744186 0.437592 0 1 1 
Picked up purchase selection   342   179 0.312849 0.464954 0 1 1 
Note: * indicates questions used ranking answers with 1 = strongly agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = somewhat 
disagree, and 5 = strongly disagree.   
Table 5. Depicts the amount of participants, mean, standard deviation, and the min/max value for 
all variables used in the Logistic Model Predicting Vote Buy Gap. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of participants that voted in support of the proposition banning snacks made 
with eggs from caged hens by treatment.
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Figure 2. Snack options selected from pre-vote shopping scenario by treatment. 
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Figure 3. Snack options selected after the vote, assuming the vote passed, by treatment. 
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Figure 4. Vote-buy gap percentages for individuals that initially selected caged and cage free 
eggs by treatment. 
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Figure 5. Percent of individuals who selected granola or none as their purchase option who voted 
in support of the proposed ballot initiative. 
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Figure 6. Mean agreement or disagreement with the following statement: I believe my vote did not 
matter in this study and the voting outcome would have been the same regardless of my voting 
decision. 1 = strongly agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = somewhat 
disagree, and 5 = strongly disagree. 
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Figure 7. Percent of individuals who originally selected a cookie option before the vote, but did 
not purchase a cookie option once the cookies made with caged eggs were banned.  
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Figure 8: Survey 
Survey Introduction Used for All Treatments  
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION Oklahoma State University     Title: Consumers’ Preferences for 
Food Products Containing Eggs    Investigators: Andrew Paul and Jayson Lusk, PhD    Purpose: 
The purpose of this research is to determine preferences for different types of cookies in 
different decision making contexts.    What to Expect: This research will be administered online. 
You will be asked to make a series of choices between different cookie options that may be 
purchased.  You will be given a total of $10 for participation which can be picked up at a later 
date.  You can use this $10 to purchase cookies.  Any remaining money left over after your 
purchase will be given to you.  The specific procedures that will be employed will be explained 
on your computer screen as you proceed through the experiment.  Once the session is 
completed you will be given a date and time in which you may pick up your remaining money 
and your food selection. Your participation is expected to last approximately thirty 
minutes.    Risks:  There are no known risks associated with this project which are greater than 
those ordinarily encountered in daily life.    Benefits:  Results from the study will be used to help 
farmers, food processors, retailers, and regulators make better decisions about how to improve 
the production and distribution of food in a way that is desirable to 
consumers.     Compensation:  You will be given a credit of $10 at the beginning of this 
session.  You may choose to use some of this money to purchase a food option.  After the food 
purchase, you will be able to keep any of the remaining money. Once the session is completed 
you will be given a date and time in which you may pick up any remaining money and your food 
selection.  Your participation in today’s session is voluntary.  In the event that you decide to 
discontinue your participation at any point, you can still collect the participation fee when you 
choose to depart.     Your Rights and Confidentiality: Your participation in this research is 
voluntary.  There is no penalty for refusal to participate, and you are free to withdraw your 
consent and participation in this project at any time.     Confidentiality: You will be assigned an 
ID number to assure confidentiality.  Your responses are anonymous.  We will have no way to 
link individual’s names to responses.  In the reports of the data, neither your name nor specific 
personal information will be released.  Results of the survey will only be used in aggregate form 
and only for research purposes.  Data will be stored on hard drive in Mr. Paul’s, Dr. Norwood’s, 
and Lusk’s offices.  We do not intend to destroy the data file.  The OSU IRB has the authority to 
inspect consent records and data files to assure compliance with approved 
procedures.    Contacts: For any questions about the survey, you may contact Andrew Paul at 
421-G Agricultural Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078, 661-201-3573, or andrew.s.paul@okstate.edu. If 
you have questions about your rights as a research volunteer, you may contact the IRB Office at 
223 Scott Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078, 405-744-3377 or irb@okstate.edu.    If you choose to 
participate: Please, click NEXT if you choose to participate. By clicking NEXT, you are indicating 
that you freely and voluntarily and agree to participate in this study and you also acknowledge 
that you are at least 18 years of age.     It is recommended that you print a copy of this consent 
page for your records before you begin the study by clicking below. 
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As indicated, you will be given $10 in cash for participating in this study. You may use this money 
to purchase a cookie from the listed items you will be shown. You will also be able to keep any 
of the remaining money that you do not use in your purchase. Importantly, your decisions are 
NOT hypothetical.  We will REALLY pay you $10.  We will REALLY charge you the price of 
whatever you buy. After your final purchase is selected, you will be able to pick up your money 
and food selection in room 419 located in Ag Hall on March 8, 2016 or March 9, 2016 between 9 
a.m. - 11 a.m. and 2 p.m. - 5 p.m.  To ensure confidentiality, and to ensure you receive the 
proper amount of money, you have been randomly assigned the following ID number: Please 
write this number down and bring it with you. It is the only way we have of connecting you with 
your payment. To make sure you understand the incentives, please answer the following 
questions. 
 
 Are your choices on this survey hypothetical or non-hypothetical? 
 My choices are hypothetical; I won't really be paid or receive food 
 My choices are not hypothetical; I will really be paid and will pay for food I choose 
 
Where can you pick up your payment for participating? 
 Student Union 
 Ag Hall 
 Library 
 
What is your randomly assigned ID number? 
 
Treatment 1 (Control)  
Today you will participate in two decision making exercises. One of these exercises will be 
randomly selected as binding. Again, your choices are NOT hypothetical. If you choose a cookie 
at a particular price, you will really be given that cookie and the price will be deducted from your 
$10 payment.  We will now begin the first exercise. 
 
Listed below are four different cookie options made using eggs from different farms. Please 
select the cookie (or granola bar) that you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, 
then you will really get the cookie or granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be 
deducted from the $10 cash credit you were given at the beginning of this session.  
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You have been randomly assigned to a group with 5 other participants. You will not know the 
other individuals in your group, only that the size of your group (including you) is 5. Now, you 
have the opportunity to vote on a proposition that might affect everyone's cookie choice in your 
group. If more than 50% of your group (3 or more) vote in favor of the proposition (by selecting 
"support"), it will pass. If more than 50% of your group (3 or more) vote against the proposition 
(by selecting "oppose"), it will fail. In the case that the proposition passes, you may have to 
make a different choice than the one you originally made; we will ask you to do that 
momentarily, but first vote on the proposition. 
 
Proposition   STANDARDS FOR CONFINING FARM ANIMALS. Requires that chicken eggs used to 
make cookies in your group come from a system where hens are confined only in ways that 
allow these animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around freely. Please 
select whether you support or oppose this proposition. 
 Support requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 Oppose requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
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We will not know whether the proposition passes until everyone in your group votes. Just in 
case the majority of people in your group vote in favor of the proposition, please indicate which 
options you would prefer given the now more restrictive set of choice options. 
 
Listed below are two different cookie options made using eggs from different farms that comply 
with the confinement standards in the proposition. Please select the cookie (or granola bar) that 
you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, then you will really get the cookie or 
granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be deducted from the $10 cash credit you 
were given at the beginning of this session.  
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Treatment 2 
Today you will participate in two decision making exercises. One of these exercises will be 
randomly selected as binding. Again, your choices are NOT hypothetical. If you choose a cookie 
at a particular price, you will really be given that cookie and the price will be deducted from your 
$10 payment.  We will now begin the first exercise. 
 
Listed below are four different cookie options made using eggs from different farms. Please 
select the cookie (or granola bar) that you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, 
then you will really get the cookie or granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be 
deducted from the $10 cash credit you were given at the beginning of this session.  
 
You have been randomly assigned to a group with 51 other participants. You will not know the 
other individuals in your group, only that the size of your group (including you) is 51. Now, you 
have the opportunity to vote on a proposition that might affect everyone's cookie choice in your 
group. If more than 50% of your group (26 or more) vote in favor of the proposition (by selecting 
"support"), it will pass. If more than 50% of your group (26 or more) vote against the proposition 
(by selecting "oppose"), it will fail. In the case that the proposition passes, you may have to 
make a different choice than the one you originally made; we will ask you to do that 
momentarily, but first vote on the proposition. 
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Proposition   STANDARDS FOR CONFINING FARM ANIMALS. Requires that chicken eggs used to 
make cookies in your group come from a system where hens are confined only in ways that 
allow these animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around freely. Please 
select whether you support or oppose this proposition. 
 Support requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 Oppose requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 
We will not know whether the proposition passes until everyone in your group votes. Just in 
case the majority of people in your group vote in favor of the proposition, please indicate which 
options you would prefer given the now more restrictive set of choice options. 
 
Listed below are two different cookie options made using eggs from different farms that comply 
with the confinement standards in the proposition. Please select the cookie (or granola bar) that 
you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, then you will really get the cookie or 
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granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be deducted from the $10 cash credit you 
were given at the beginning of this session.  
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Treatment 3 
Today you will participate in two decision making exercises. One of these exercises will be 
randomly selected as binding. Again, your choices are NOT hypothetical. If you choose a cookie 
at a particular price, you will really be given that cookie and the price will be deducted from your 
$10 payment.  We will now begin the first exercise. 
Listed below are four different cookie options made using eggs from different farms. Please 
select the cookie (or granola bar) that you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, 
then you will really get the cookie or granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be 
deducted from the $10 cash credit you were given at the beginning of this session.  
 
You have been randomly assigned to a group with 5 other participants. You will not know the 
other individuals in your group, only that the size of your group (including you) is 5. Now, you 
have the opportunity to vote on a proposition that might affect everyone's cookie choice in your 
group. If more than 50% of your group (3 or more) vote in favor of the proposition (by selecting 
"support"), it will pass. If more than 50% of your group (3 or more) vote against the proposition 
(by selecting "oppose"), it will fail. In the case that the proposition passes, you may have to 
make a different choice than the one you originally made; we will ask you to do that 
momentarily, but first vote on the proposition. 
 
Proposition   STANDARDS FOR CONFINING FARM ANIMALS. Requires that chicken eggs used to 
make cookies in your group come from a system where hens are confined only in ways that 
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allow these animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around freely. Please 
select whether you support or oppose this proposition. 
 Support requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 Oppose requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 
We will not know whether the proposition passes until everyone in your group votes. Just in 
case the majority of people in your group vote in favor of the proposition, please indicate which 
options you would prefer given the now more restrictive set of choice options. 
Listed below are two different cookie options made using eggs from different farms that comply 
with the confinement standards in the proposition. Please select the cookie (or granola bar) that 
you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, then you will really get the cookie or 
granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be deducted from the $10 cash credit you 
were given at the beginning of this session.  
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Treatment 4 
Today you will participate in two decision making exercises. One of these exercises will be 
randomly selected as binding. Again, your choices are NOT hypothetical. If you choose a cookie 
at a particular price, you will really be given that cookie and the price will be deducted from your 
$10 payment.  We will now begin the first exercise. 
 
Listed below are four different cookie options made using eggs from different farms. Please 
select the cookie (or granola bar) that you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, 
then you will really get the cookie or granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be 
deducted from the $10 cash credit you were given at the beginning of this session.  
 
You have been randomly assigned to a group with 51 other participants. You will not know the 
other individuals in your group, only that the size of your group (including you) is 51. Now, you 
have the opportunity to vote on a proposition that might affect everyone's cookie choice in your 
group. If more than 50% of your group (26 or more) vote in favor of the proposition (by selecting 
"support"), it will pass. If more than 50% of your group (26 or more) vote against the proposition 
(by selecting "oppose"), it will fail. In the case that the proposition passes, you may have to 
make a different choice than the one you originally made; we will ask you to do that 
momentarily, but first vote on the proposition. 
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Proposition   STANDARDS FOR CONFINING FARM ANIMALS. Requires that chicken eggs used to 
make cookies in your group come from a system where hens are confined only in ways that 
allow these animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around freely. Please 
select whether you support or oppose this proposition. 
 Support requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 Oppose requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 
We will not know whether the proposition passes until everyone in your group votes. Just in 
case the majority of people in your group vote in favor of the proposition, please indicate which 
options you would prefer given the now more restrictive set of choice options. 
 
Listed below are two different cookie options made using eggs from different farms that comply 
with the confinement standards in the proposition. Please select the cookie (or granola bar) that 
you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, then you will really get the cookie or 
granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be deducted from the $10 cash credit you 
were given at the beginning of this session.  
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Treatment 5 
Today you will participate in two decision making exercises. One of these exercises will be 
randomly selected as binding. Again, your choices are NOT hypothetical. If you choose a cookie 
at a particular price, you will really be given that cookie and the price will be deducted from your 
$10 payment.  We will now begin the first exercise. 
 
Listed below are four different cookie options made using eggs from different farms. Please 
select the cookie (or granola bar) that you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, 
then you will really get the cookie or granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be 
deducted from the $10 cash credit you were given at the beginning of this session.  
 
You have been randomly assigned to a group with 51 other participants. You will not know the 
other individuals in your group, only that the size of your group (including you) is 51.      Now, 
you have the opportunity to vote on a proposition that might affect everyone's cookie choice in 
your group. If more than 50% of your group (26 or more) vote in favor of the proposition (by 
selecting "support"), it will pass. If more than 50% of your group (26 or more) vote against the 
proposition (by selecting "oppose"), it will fail.   For your information, we have polled other 
Oklahoma State students to ask how they would vote on an initiative like this. 62.90% of 
respondents to this poll said they would vote in favor of the initiative.     In the case that the 
proposition passes, you may have to make a different choice than the one you originally made; 
we will ask you to do that momentarily, but first vote on the proposition. 
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Proposition   STANDARDS FOR CONFINING FARM ANIMALS. Requires that chicken eggs used to 
make cookies in your group come from a system where hens are confined only in ways that 
allow these animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around freely. Please 
select whether you support or oppose this proposition. 
 Support requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 Oppose requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 
We will not know whether the proposition passes until everyone in your group votes. Just in 
case the majority of people in your group vote in favor of the proposition, please indicate which 
options you would prefer given the now more restrictive set of choice options. 
 
Listed below are two different cookie options made using eggs from different farms that comply 
with the confinement standards in the proposition. Please select the cookie (or granola bar) that 
you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, then you will really get the cookie or 
granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be deducted from the $10 cash credit you 
were given at the beginning of this session.  
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Treatment 6 
Today you will participate in two decision making exercises. One of these exercises will be 
randomly selected as binding. Again, your choices are NOT hypothetical. If you choose a cookie 
at a particular price, you will really be given that cookie and the price will be deducted from your 
$10 payment.  We will now begin the first exercise. 
 
Listed below are four different cookie options made using eggs from different farms. Please 
select the cookie (or granola bar) that you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, 
then you will really get the cookie or granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be 
deducted from the $10 cash credit you were given at the beginning of this session.  
 
You have been randomly assigned to a group with 51 other participants. You will not know the 
other individuals in your group, only that the size of your group (including you) is 51.      Now, 
you have the opportunity to vote on a proposition that might affect everyone's cookie choice in 
your group. If more than 50% of your group (26 or more) vote in favor of the proposition (by 
selecting "support"), it will pass. If more than 50% of your group (26 or more) vote against the 
proposition (by selecting "oppose"), it will fail.  For your information, we have polled other 
Oklahoma State students to ask how they would vote on an initiative like this. 61.9% of 
respondents to this poll said they would vote in favor of the initiative.     In the case that the 
proposition passes, you may have to make a different choice than the one you originally made; 
we will ask you to do that momentarily, but first vote on the proposition. 
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Proposition   STANDARDS FOR CONFINING FARM ANIMALS. Requires that chicken eggs used to 
make cookies in your group come from a system where hens are confined only in ways that 
allow these animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around freely. Please 
select whether you support or oppose this proposition. 
 Support requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 Oppose requirement that sales of cookies containing chicken eggs in my group meet 
confinement standards. 
 
We will not know whether the proposition passes until everyone in your group votes. Just in 
case the majority of people in your group vote in favor of the proposition, please indicate which 
options you would prefer given the now more restrictive set of choice options. 
 
Listed below are two different cookie options made using eggs from different farms that comply 
with the confinement standards in the proposition. Please select the cookie (or granola bar) that 
you prefer. Recall, if this decision is ultimately binding, then you will really get the cookie or 
granola bar you selected and the price indicated will be deducted from the $10 cash credit you 
were given at the beginning of this session.  
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End of Survey Questionnaire Used for All Treatments 
Please answer the following questions beginning on the next page. 
 
Q44 Are you the primary shopper for food in your household? 
 Yes 
 No 
 The food shopping responsibilities in my household are equally shared. 
 
Q45 Are you on a diet? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q46 Is there anything special about today that influenced your decision on your purchase? 
 Yes - Explain: ____________________ 
 No 
 
Q47 Are you vegetarian, vegan etc.? 
 Vegetarian 
 Vegan 
 Other 
 Most of the time 
 No 
 
Q48 Do you agree or disagree that: The government should advise consumers on what to 
eat/drink? 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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Q49 Do you agree or disagree that: The government should limit what consumers can eat/drink? 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Q50 Do you agree or disagree that: I thought very hard about the purchase choice I selected 
today? 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Q51 Which item characteristic is most important to you when making your purchase choice? 
 Price 
 Anticipated taste 
 Healthfulness 
 Production practice (cage-free, organic, caged, color of egg) 
 Safety (low risk of food-borne illness) 
 
Q52 When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as liberal or conservative? 
 Extremely liberal 
 Slightly liberal 
 Moderate 
 Slightly conservative 
 Extremely conservative 
 I don't know 
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Q53 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I trust in the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration." 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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Q54 Which political party do you most identify with? 
 Democrat 
 Republican 
 Libertarian 
 Tea Party 
 I am independent 
 Other (e.g., Green) 
 
Q55 Are you married? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q56 What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Q57 Do you or does anyone in your immediate family (grandparents, parents, siblings, aunts, or 
uncles) farm or ranch for a living? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q58 Which college are you in? 
 CASNR 
 CAS 
 Education 
 CEAT 
 Human Sciences 
 Spears School of Business 
 CVHS 
 Other 
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Q59 What is your age? 
 18 years 
 19 years 
 20 years 
 21 years 
 22 years 
 23 years 
 24 years 
 24 years 
 25 years 
 26 years 
 27 years 
 28 years 
 29 years 
 30 years 
 31 years 
 32 years 
 33 years 
 34 years 
 35 years 
 36 years 
 37 years 
 38 years 
 39 years 
 40 years 
 41 years 
 42 years 
 43 years 
 44 years 
 45 years 
 46 years 
 47 years 
 48 years 
 49 years 
 50 years 
 51 years 
 52 years 
 53 years 
 54 years 
 55 years 
 56 years 
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 57 years 
 58 years 
 59 years 
 60 years 
 61 years 
 62 years 
 63 years 
 64 years 
 65 years 
 66 years 
 67 years 
 68 years 
 69 years 
 70 years 
 71 years 
 72 years 
 73 years 
 74 years 
 75 years 
 76 years 
 77 years 
 78 years 
 79 years 
 80 years 
 81 years 
 82 years 
 83 years 
 84 years 
 85 years 
 86 years 
 87 years 
 88 years 
 89 years 
 90 years 
 91 years 
 92 years 
 93 years 
 94 years 
 95 years 
 96 years 
 97 years 
 98 years 
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 99 years 
 
Q60 At your current residence, what is your household size? This is the total number of people 
in your household including yourself. 
 1 person 
 2 people 
 3 people 
 4 people 
 5 or more people 
 
Q61 What is your education level thus far? 
 Some college 
 Bachelor's degree 
 Graduate degree 
 
Q62 What race or ethnicity do you consider yourself? 
 White 
 Black or African American 
 Hispanic 
 American Indian 
 Asian 
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
 Other 
 
Q63 Are you financially supported by: 
 No one 
 Parents 
 Spouse 
 Other 
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Q64 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets? 
 100 minutes 
 5 minutes 
 
Q65 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days 
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half the 
lake? 
 24 days 
 47 days 
 
Q66 Do you agree or disagree: Purchasing local foods is the best option? 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Q67 I voted in favor of the ballot initiative during the session. 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q68 When voting do you agree or disagree: I considered how my vote may affect other 
individuals' purchase options? 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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Q69 If the prices were to be raised on each product by $2, would you have spent the $10 in the 
same way? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q70 Do you agree or disagree: I believe my vote did not matter in this study and the voting 
outcome would have been the same regardless of my voting decision? 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Q71 Do you agree or disagree: I don't like imposing my views on my group members? 
 Yes, I do 
 No, I do not 
 
Q72 Do you agree or disagree: I am nervous about the outcome of this vote. 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree or disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Q73 Do you agree or disagree: The outcome of the vote will be fair. 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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Q74 Do you agree or disagree: I feel that my vote had a positive impact on production practices 
and animal welfare. 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Q75 When selecting my purchase option, I knew which brands were cage-free chicken eggs and 
which brands were not.  
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q76 How many people were in your group? 
 5 
 26 
 51 
 
Thank you for participating.     You will be able to pick up your money and food selection in room 
419 located in Ag Hall on March 8, 2016 or March 9, 2016 between 9 a.m. - 11 a.m. and 2 p.m. - 
5 p.m.      Please, remember to bring with you your randomly assigned ID number. For any 
questions, you may contact Andrew Paul at 421-G Agricultural Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078, 661-
201-3573, or andrew.s.paul@okstate.edu 
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APPENDIX – B  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Pre-vote snack selection and vote preference by treatment. 
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